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ARTICLE
A COMITY OF ERRORS: WHY
JOHN V. BAKER IS ONLY A
TENTATIVE FIRST STEP IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION
CARL H. JOHNSON*
This Article examines the role of tribal courts in the administration of justice in rural Alaska. This Article begins by describing
the relationship between Native tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight
and the U.S. government, and continues by contextualizing and
comparing this relationship with the relationship between Alaska
Native tribes and the State of Alaska. The Article progresses by
providing an overview and analysis of the comity solution articulated in the recent John v. Baker decision, and continues by acknowledging that, although the decision is an important step in
recognizing tribal sovereignty, it fails to create a coherent partnership between Alaska tribal courts and the Alaska court system.
The author concludes by proposing that Alaska’s administration
of justice would be better served by replacing John v. Baker’s
comity solution with full faith and credit recognition of tribal
court decisions.

I. INTRODUCTION
I have heard talk and talk, but nothing is done. Good words do
not last long unless they amount to something.
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I am tired of talk that comes to nothing.
It makes my heart sick when I remember all the good words and
broken promises.
There has been too much talking by men who had no right to
talk. Too many misrepresentations have been made; too many
misunderstandings have come up. . . .
When the white man treats an Indian as they treat each other,
then we will have no more wars. We shall all be alike—brothers
of one father and one mother, with one sky above us and one
government for all.
1
— Chief Joseph, Nez Perce (1879)

Ever since the infancy of this Union, the federal government
and the many states have attempted to interpret, understand, and
shape their relations with the many tribes that were the original
2
sovereigns of this continent. Originally, the Founding Fathers
sought to treat the Indian tribes as sovereigns over which the federal government held exclusive authority to shape relations with
3
the United States. Aside from the few guidelines established in the
4
Constitution, the Framers gave little thought as to how relations
5
with the Indian tribes might develop.

1. THE WISDOM OF THE GREAT CHIEFS: THE CLASSIC SPEECHES OF RED
JACKET, CHIEF JOSEPH AND CHIEF SEATTLE 58-59, 61 (Kent Nerburn ed., 1994).
2. The Native people of this continent have long been considered in our jurisprudence to be self-governing political communities that possess an inherent
sovereignty pre-dating the arrival of Europeans. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
685-86 (1990); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 580 (1832).
With that sovereignty comes the inherent power “to determine what shall be an
offense against its authority and to punish such offenses.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at
320 (referring to state and federal sovereignty).
3. See Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 129
F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.S.D. 1955):
That the founding fathers regarded Indian tribes as sovereigns is further
exemplified by the fact that they dealt with them by treaty, both under
the Articles of Confederation, the first one of which was made with the
Delaware Nation in 1778 . . . and under the Constitution, the first such
treaty being with the Creek Nation in 1790.
4. Indian tribes are only expressly mentioned three times in the Constitution.
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207 (1982 ed.). Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to
“regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.” Article I, section 2 originally addressed how representatives
and taxes would be apportioned among the states, “excluding Indians not taxed,”
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Beginning in the late eighteenth century and continuing for
most of the nineteenth century, Congress established that the
treaty process would be the exclusive means for developing rela6
tionships with the Indian tribes and nations. As white settlers continued to push westward and demand more access to land and resources, conflicts and treaties between the federal government and
the Indian tribes became more frequent. On March 3, 1871, the
and was subsequently modified by the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude any
reference to slavery. It retained the portion referring to “Indians not taxed.”
Even with this limited guidance, however, the Constitution recognizes tribal
governments as sovereign alongside states, foreign nations and the federal government. See Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, Tribal Sovereignty and the Administration
of Justice in Indian Country, Remarks at Civil Jurisdiction of Tribal and State
Courts: From Conflicts to Common Ground, A National Conference (June 30-July
2, 1991), in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS REPORT 7 (Linda K. Ridge ed.) [hereinafter “CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS REPORT”]; see also Iron Crow, 129 F. Supp. at 19
(“It would therefore appear that the Constitution not only acknowledges the
authority of the federal government with regard to Indian tribes but also recognizes the existence of Indian tribes as political sovereigns.”).
5. See Curtis G. Berkey, United States—Indian Relations: The Constitutional
Basis, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 190, 224 (Oren R. Lyons & John C.
Mohawk eds., 1992) (noting that the Framers were only concerned with ensuring
federal supremacy over Indian relations, not with defining the nature of that relationship). One scholar has suggested that the Framers failed to put more consideration into the relationship with Indian tribes because the Framers “almost certainly assumed that tribes would simply die out under the combined weight of
capitalism, Christianity, and military power.”
CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 103 (1987).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Act of June 30, 1984, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat.
730 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)). The Act reads as follows:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or
claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person who, not
being employed under the authority of the United States, attempts to
negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat [sic]
with any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any
lands by them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent
of any State who may be present at any treaty held with Indians under
the authority of the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the
same, may, however, propose to, and adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to lands within such State, which
shall be extinguished by treaty.
As a result, the development of relationships with Indian tribes was entirely
vested in the federal government. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979); McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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treaty process ended.7 It was only four years prior to the termination of that phase in federal Indian policy that the United States
purchased the Alaska territory from the occupying Russian gov8
ernment. Because of this short time frame, the indigenous peoples
9
of Alaska never entered into any treaties with the United States.
The principles of federal Indian law that developed regarding the
tribes of the Lower Forty-Eight seemed inapplicable to the Natives
10
of Alaska.
Nothing in the history surrounding the treaty process indicates
that Congress or the President considered tribes in Alaska to be

7. See Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-04
(1975). One commentator has noted that this policy shift was based on the decision of Congress to no longer treat Indian tribes as sovereign nations. See
ROBERT D. ARNOLD ET AL., ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 51 (1978). The decision to terminate the treaty process was not based on a shifting view toward Indian tribes, however, but on increasing inter-institutional jealousy by the House of
Representatives over the Senate’s exclusive treaty power and its ability to shape
federal Indian policy. Also, Congress wanted to end what had been viewed as the
intolerable conduct of the Office of Indian Affairs in negotiating false or fraudulent treaties which it intended to ignore or violate. See COHEN, supra note 4, at
106-07; FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 67 (1976);
LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 55-58 (1927). The Act
of 1871 did not alter the nature or status of Indian governments; it merely stated
that the executive branch would no longer engage in treaties with tribes. See
Contemporary Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 109, 115 (National
Lawyers Guild Committee on Native American Struggles ed., 1982).
8. See Treaty of Cession, Act of May 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. It is important to
note for this discussion that the Treaty of Cession declared that Indian tribes of
Alaska would be subject to the same laws that applied to the aboriginal tribes
throughout the United States. See id. art. III.
Even though Congress did not completely terminate the policy of negotiating
treaties with Indian tribes until 1871, it foreshadowed this policy shift in 1867, the
same year as the purchase of the Alaska territory, by enacting a law that repealed
“all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the commissioner
of Indian Affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian tribes.” Act of Mar. 25,
1867, ch. 13, § 6, 15 Stat. 7, 9; see also Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 16, § 5, 16 Stat. 13,
40. Although this law was repealed a few months later, the Act signaled the
growing dissatisfaction with the House because it excluded Indian affairs from its
control. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 107.
9. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 769 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, C.J., and
Compton, J., dissenting); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977);
COHEN, supra note 4, at 739.
10. See DAVID S. CASE, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OF ALASKA NATIVES TO
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (Alaska Native Foundation 1978).
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fundamentally distinct from those in the rest of the nation.11 The
need for treaties simply did not arise until the first major gold dis12
covery in the new territory, near Juneau, in 1880. This lack of a
treaty relationship is the basic legal distinction between the tribes
13
of Alaska and those in the Lower Forty-Eight. Some have suggested that because Alaska Native villages organized their leadership differently than Lower Forty-Eight tribes, they should not be
14
treated like outside tribes. This oversimplification ignores the reality that tribes in Alaska have always shared the same goals of
achieving self-government and enforcing the guarantees on their
15
rights to use their land as do tribes of the Lower Forty-Eight.

11. Apparently, the treatment of Alaska Natives was based primarily on their
former classification under Russian rule. See id.
12. Prior to this time, white settlers did not encroach upon Alaska Native territory to any degree that necessitated an agreement or settlement between Natives
and the federal government. See ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at 66 (observing
that without significant movement of white settlers into Alaska, “there was not the
same urgency to extinguish Indian title as existed in the American West, [and
therefore] there was no need to make treaties with native tribes”); see also Moses
v. Native Vill. of Mekoryuk, No. 3AN-98-03859 c/w 3AN-97-07291 CI, Decision
and Order, 11 (Alaska Super. Ct., Jan. 8, 1999) (noting that “political pressure to
dispossess aboriginal lands was not as great as it was in the other . . . states”).
13. Alaska, however, does not have as unique of a history as this distinction
might imply. Tribes in several states, particularly California, New Mexico and
Oklahoma, also have experiences that distinguish them from the model of the
“typical” Indian tribe. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive
Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364,
54,365 (Oct. 21, 1993).
14. See id.
15. Regardless of what form of government tribes have chosen, traditional
governments and traditional leaders almost uniformly assert the full rights of nationhood: the right to self-government, freedom from intervention, territorial integrity and other essential rights attaching to the status of nationhood. See International NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in
the Americas—1977, 3 AM. INDIAN. J. 1 (Nov. 1977); THOMAS R. BERGER,
VILLAGE JOURNEY 120 (1985) (“Like the Creeks, Alaska Natives want to govern
themselves, and they also insist on guarantees for their land. It is easy to see a
continuity, a coherence, a connectedness in these demands extending in an unbroken line from before Alexander McGillivray’s time to the present.”) Alexander
McGillivray was a tribal leader who, along with thirty other Indian leaders, traveled to meet President George Washington in New York to sign a treaty in 1790.
Part of the fallacy in the analysis put forth by those seeking to define some arbitrary distinction between Lower Forty-Eight tribes and Alaska tribes based on
what form of government they traditionally employed rests in the belief that nonNatives define what it means to be a Native community. See WILKINSON, supra
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Alaska Native groups have endured a long history of legal disparity as a result of this difference. In 1955, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that natural resources taken from Alaska Native
16
lands were not entitled to compensation. The Court commented
that case law consistently found that absent some explicit recognition by Congress for some possessory right, no compensation was
17
required when Indian country was taken. The Court added that,
as “[e]very American schoolboy knows,” all Indians, including
Alaska Natives, were deprived of their lands by being conquered
18
by American troops, not through treaties.
Following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
19
Act (“ANCSA”) in 1971, courts and commentators were divided
20
about the status of tribal sovereignty or Indian country in Alaska.
note 5, at 77-78 (noting that the existence and identity of a tribe comes from its
own members, not from external authorities).
16. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-91 (1955).
17. See id. at 277.
18. Id. at 289-90 (“Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of
this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even
when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their
land.”). While originally intended as a personal jab against Felix Cohen, the preeminent author on federal Indian law, this unfounded assertion found its way into
a significant U.S. Supreme Court case. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148
U. PENN. L. REV. 1065, 1129-30 (2000) (noting that Justice Reed’s comments were
meant to correct Felix Cohen’s view that lands were purchased or otherwise acquired peacefully from the Natives of this continent); David Wilkins, QuitClaiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (1998) (noting that Justice Reed’s comments in the TeeHit-Ton case contained “one of the most glaring misrepresentations of fact ever
uttered by a Supreme Court Justice. There is little in the historical record to corroborate Justice Reed’s contention.”); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal
Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 32 (1996) (“Every learned schoolchild would be
appalled by this point, for it cannot be defended as accurate, if incomplete. Instead, it is just plain wrong, a mixture of myth and ethnocentrism masquerading as
past legal practice.”). Frickey added that “[o]ne of the oddest things about Justice
Reed’s dictum is that Tee-Hit-Ton involved the taking of aboriginal property interests in Alaska, where no Seventh Cavalry ever waged war upon Natives.” Id. at
32 n.11.
19. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-29 (1994)). This act was passed to resolve disputed land claims with
Alaska Natives.
20. See, e.g., Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229, 1234
(Alaska 1992) (Moore, J., concurring) (observing that “no court has expressly
considered whether a Native group which once resided on a federally recognized
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Seeking to clarify the issue, the Department of the Interior, and
later, Congress declared the inherent sovereignty of tribes in
21
Alaska and their status as federally recognized tribes. Despite
this declaration, state courts continue to deny the sovereign status
22
of tribes in Alaska. This deviates substantially from the wellestablished principle that recognition of tribal governments is a
non-justiciable political question that Congress and the executive
23
branch should settle.
Prior to its decision in John v. Baker,24 the Alaska Supreme
Court consistently had rejected the notion of tribal sovereignty in
Alaska with the exception of one tribe that occupied reservation
25
lands in the Southeast. In Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette
26
Island Reserve v. Egan, the court held that because of the lack of a
treaty relationship between the federal government and Alaska’s

reservation in Alaska constitutes a sovereign Indian tribe after the passage of
ANCSA”); Jones v. State, 936 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (noting that
while the Indian country statute refers to “Indian allotments,” it does not refer to
Native Alaska allotments, thus making it unclear as to whether Indian country
exists in Alaska); Benjamin W. Thompson, The De Facto Termination of Alaska
Native Sovereignty: An Anomaly in an Era of Self-Determination, 24 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 421, 443 (2000) (commenting that both Public Law 280 and ANCSA contribute to the elimination of tribal sovereignty in Alaska); Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and Debasement of Tribal
Sovereignty, 18 BUFFALO PUB. INT. L.J. 147 (2000) (observing that “ANCSA’s
provisions merely changed the nature of the land title held by Natives; it did not
purport to extinguish, or even limit, tribal sovereignty”); Marilyn J. Ward Ford,
Indian Country and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They Survive ANCSA?, 14
ALASKA L. REV. 443, 450 (1997).
21. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364 (Oct. 21, 1993); Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454, 108 Stat.
4791 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479a (1994)).
22. See, e.g., Moses v. Native Vill. of Mekoryuk, 3AN-97-07291 CI, Decision
and Order (Alaska Super. Ct., Jan. 8, 1999) (refusing to recognize the authority of
the Secretary of Interior to recognize Alaska Native groups as tribes and opining
that the congressional act did not recognize the inherent sovereignty of Alaska’ s
tribes), available at http://www.alaskabar.org/opinions/42.html.
23. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); United States v.
Dewey County, 14 F.2d 784, 788 (D.S.D. 1926); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d
151, 162-63 (Alaska 1977).
24. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
25. See Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 162 (finding that, “despite its unique history,”
the Metlakatla Indian Community was entitled to sovereign immunity).
26. 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), vacated by 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
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tribes, “[t]here are not now and never have been tribes of Indians
in Alaska as that term is used in federal Indian law.”27
In its 1988 decision Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning,28 the court pronounced that most Native
groups in Alaska were “not self-governing or in any meaningful
29
sense sovereign.” The Stevens court added that even if the federal
government treats a Native village as a tribe, for example, through
implementing a tribal constitution under the Indian Reorganization
30
31
Act, this treatment does not afford a village tribal status. The
dissent noted, however, that it was up to Congress to waive a
32
tribe’s sovereign immunity, not the courts.
27. Id. at 917-18. The court added that “no permanent reservations have ever
been created for Indians in Alaska.” Id. at 918. It is clear, then, that the Alaska
Supreme Court’s earliest decision on Indian sovereignty in Alaska was based entirely on the State’s lack of both a treaty relationship and reservations.

28 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
29. See id. at 34. The Alaska Supreme Court found that this conclusion was
supported by its previous decisions in Atkinson, 569 P.2d 151 and Metlakatla Indian Community, 362 P.2d 901. The court also noted that “the history of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives up to the passage of
the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), indicates that Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereigns.”
Stevens, 757 P.2d at 34. Rather than conducting its own analysis, the court relied
primarily on a governor’s task force report in reaching this conclusion. See id. at
37-39. It has been noted that the Stevens case was the progenitor of an ideological
shift in the Alaska Supreme Court. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID VOLUCK,
ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS (2d ed. forthcoming 2001) (advance copy
on file with author).
30. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 9847 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-72 (1994)).
31. See Stevens, 757 P.2d at 40. This analysis ignored the long-settled notion
that recognition of tribes by the federal government is a non-justiciable political
question. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); United States v.
Dewey County, 14 F.2d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1926); Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 162-63.
32. See Stevens, 757 P.2d at 43-44 (Rabinowitz, C.J., and Compton, J., dissenting). The dissent added that it was not relevant that Congress never specifically recognized the village as a tribe; what was more relevant was that Congress
had never waived the village’s sovereignty. See id. at 47; see also Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (noting that even though Congress has the power to
regulate Indian affairs, local powers of Indian tribes are not necessarily derived
from the Constitution). The Court reasoned as follows:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. . . . That Congress has in certain ways regulated
the manner and extent of the tribal power of self-government does not
mean that Congress is the source of that power.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 328 (1978).
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With the notable exception of Governor Cowper’s short-lived
order recognizing tribal sovereignty in 1990, the executive branch
of Alaska also has a history of refusing to recognize tribal sover33
eignty. In 1969, the Republican administration was steadfastly
opposed to the land settlement and compensation demands that
34
were made during the ANCSA development process. As recently
as 1991, the State of Alaska refused to recognize Native Alaskan
35
communities as Native American tribes and no formal means of
36
communication existed between the two groups.
This opposition to the exercise of tribal sovereignty in Alaska
came to a head in 1986 when the State challenged the authority of
the Village of Venetie Tribal Government to tax business activities
in which the State was a joint venture partner on land acquired
37
through ANCSA. Although the district court found that ANCSA
had extinguished Indian country, the Ninth Circuit, utilizing a
38
multi-factor approach, reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s multi-factor and instead implemented a
narrower two-factor approach, eventually concluding that lands
transferred to Native villages under ANCSA do not constitute In39
dian country as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).
In 1999, Governor Tony Knowles invited tribal representatives
to meet with state cabinet members to negotiate an accord, on a

33. See Administrative Order No. 123, Sept. 10, 1990, http://www.gov.state.ak.
us/admin-orders/123.html.
34. See Alexander M. Ervin, The Emergence of Native Alaska Political Capacity, 1959-1971, MUSK OX J. 19 (1976), available at http://www.alaskool.org/projects/
ancsa/ARTICLES/ervin1976/Ervin_MuskOx.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
35. See Administrative Order No. 125, Aug. 16, 1991, http://www.gov.state.ak.
us/admin-orders/125.html, whereby Governor Walter J. Hickel declared that
Alaska is “one country, one people” and “opposes expansion of tribal governmental powers and the creation of ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska.” This order specifically
revoked a previous order issued during Governor Cowper’s administration,
whereby the State of Alaska recognized the sovereignty of Indian tribes in Alaska
and clearly defined the jurisdictional authority of both reservation and nonreservation tribes. See Administrative Order No. 123, supra note 33.
36. See State Action Plan Summaries/Recommendations, in CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.
37. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t., 522 U.S. 520, 525
(1998).
38. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal
Gov’t., 101 F.3d 1286, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a six-factor test should
be used to interpret the term “dependent Indian communities” found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b)).
39. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530-32 (noting that the two factors contemplated
by Congress include a federal set-aside and federal superintendence).
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government-to-government basis, regarding the relationship between tribal governments and state agencies.40 In the months that
followed the meeting, Governor Knowles and tribal leaders formed
41
the State-Tribal Relations Team, which ultimately led to the
42
State’s recognition of the inherent sovereignty of Alaska’s tribes.
The State also pledged to follow the federal policy of dealing with
43
Alaska’s tribes on a government-to-government basis. Despite
the State’s policy, Alaska’s federal congressional delegation op44
posed such recognition.
It was against this historical backdrop that the Alaska Supreme Court faced its most recent challenge involving the question
45
of tribal sovereignty in Alaska. In John v. Baker, a child custody
dispute between two unmarried parents, the court recognized the
inherent sovereignty of Alaska’s tribes and declared that, despite
the Venetie decision, tribes could share concurrent jurisdiction over

40. See Don Hunter, State, Tribes to Negotiate Accord, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 7, 1999, at B1.
41. See Governor Tony Knowles, State-Tribal Relations Team, at http://www.
gov.state.ak.us.Strt/index (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
42. See Administrative Order No. 186, Sept. 29, 2000, http://www.gov.state.ak.
us/admin-orders/186.html; see also infra note 299 and accompanying text.
43. See id.:
I declare that it is the commitment and policy of the State of Alaska,
consistent with the Constitutions of the United States and the State of
Alaska, to work on a government-to-government basis with Alaska’s
sovereign Tribes, which deserve the recognition and respect accorded to
other governments. . . .
The State recognizes the value in establishing a comprehensive and
mutually respectful State-Tribal relations policy in an effort to promote
and enhance Tribal self-government, economic development, a clean and
healthy environment, and social, cultural, spiritual, and racial diversity.
See also Government to Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994):
The United States government has a unique legal relationship with Native American tribal governments as set forth in the Constitution of the
United States, treaties, statutes, and court decisions. As executive departments and agencies undertake activities affecting Native American
tribal rights or trust resources, such activities should be implemented in a
knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty.
44. See Letter from Frank Murkowski, United States Senator, Ted Stevens,
United States Senator, and Don Young, Congressman, to Tony Knowles, Governor, State of Alaska (Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with author) (expressing concern
over the “extraordinary implications of the creation of tribal authority and jurisdiction in the State” and requesting that the governor suspend any further administrative action on the issue).
45. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
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their members with the State.46 The court also declared that when
state courts are faced with an existing tribal court decree, they
should recognize the tribal court’s decision on the basis of comity,
47
not full faith and credit.
This Article provides an overview of the John v. Baker decision and assesses its strengths and weaknesses. Part II provides an
historical and legal overview of the principles that support tribal
sovereignty in Alaska. Part III promises a detailed account of the
John v. Baker decision. Part IV identifies and analyzes what this
author believes are the decision’s two key weaknesses and its primary strengths. Part IV also offers some alternatives to the court’s
decision and provides a vision for the role of tribal courts in the
administration of justice in rural Alaska. Specifically, Part IV proposes that, under the modern concept of federalism and its evolution to include tribal governments, the most appropriate doctrine
for recognizing tribal court decisions in Alaska is through full faith
and credit. Part IV argues that this method of recognition fosters
respect and partnership between court systems, something that is
sorely lacking in Alaska today. Part IV also suggests that in the absence of full faith and credit recognition, the Alaska Supreme
Court needs to solidify the burden of proof required to ignore a
tribal court decision and should apply the abstention doctrine to
tribal court proceedings. Finally, Part IV argues that as a matter of
recognizing inherent sovereignty, tribal courts should have primary
jurisdiction in matters affecting internal affairs and domestic relations. Part V concludes by suggesting that the steps taken in John
v. Baker should be expanded to increase respect for tribal courts.
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN ALASKA:
A CENTURY OF RECOGNITION BY CONGRESS
Even though Congress has spoken on the issue, one can never
discuss tribal court authority in Alaska without discussing the sovereignty of Alaska’s tribes. Unlike its predecessors, the John v.
Baker court acknowledged the inherent sovereignty of Alaska’s
tribes. Despite this recognition, tribal sovereignty in Alaska has
been challenged and decried by its opponents. Those who oppose
tribal sovereignty in Alaska claim that Congress never sought to
extend the same sovereign treatment to Alaska Natives as it did in
the Lower Forty-Eight. Inherent or retained sovereignty is perhaps the only principle of federal Indian law that has remained intact since Chief Justice Marshall’s early pronouncements. It is
46. See id. at 759-61.
47. See id. at 762-63.
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merely the reach of that sovereignty, that is, the jurisdiction over
which tribes may assert themselves, that has been limited. As
many courts have recognized, Congress may only limit that author48
ity; Congress may not grant it. In addition, those who argue in
opposition to tribal sovereignty in Alaska fail to recognize that
Congress has been including Alaska Natives within the broader
scope of federal Indian legislation for over a hundred years. This
section briefly explores the application of these principles in
Alaska.
Long before Alaska Natives entered into the discussion, the
federal government began to shape and redefine its view regarding
the role of Indian tribes in the new Republic. Chief Justice John
Marshall made the first judicial attempt to define that relationship
49
with a series of cases known as the “Marshall Trilogy.” One of
the more significant assertions in that series of cases was that Indian tribes were “domestic dependent nations” instead of foreign
50
nations. Chief Justice Marshall also noted that Indian tribes were
“distinct, independent political communities,” and that they did not
surrender their original sovereignty to the conquering United
51
States.
Quite interestingly, while Chief Justice Marshall was coming
to this conclusion, the Russian government, in the Treaty of Cession, concluded that the “dependent” Natives of Alaska would also
52
be subject to Russian laws and requirements. In the Treaty of
53
Cession, there is a reference to “uncivilized tribes.” While some
48. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 231 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)):
Perhaps the most basic principle in all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions, is that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian
tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has
never been extinguished.”
49. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
50. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; see also Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann
Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 167 (N.D. 1990) (“We recognize
that there is a difference between a ‘foreign nation’ and an ‘Indian nation’”); Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962) (discussing early westward
migration and how “the United States began to consider the Indians less as foreign nations and more as a part of our country.”).
51. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-61.
52. See ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at 21.
53. See Act of June 20, 1867, art III, 15 Stat. 539, which reads in pertinent part:
Citizenship of inhabitants; Uncivilized tribes. The inhabitants of the
ceded territory . . . may return to Russia . . . but if they should prefer to
remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized na-
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have suggested that the reference to “uncivilized” meant that tribes
in Alaska were not as “civilized” as Lower Forty-Eight tribes,54 this
was most likely a reflection of the general view of Western gov55
ernments regarding the sophistication of Indian tribes.
tive tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens. . . . The uncivilized tribes will be subject
to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time,
adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.
54. See, e.g., Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362
P.2d 901, 918 (Alaska 1961) (“There was no tribal organization as that term is
generally understood”). See generally Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History
Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353 (1997) (providing an historical analysis that enforces this proposition). But see Sybil R. Kisken, The Uncertain Legal Status of
Alaska Natives After Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning: Exposing the Fallacious Distinctions Between Alaska Natives and Lower 48
Indians, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 405, 412-13 (1989) (observing that “even though Alaska
Natives originally came under Russian Rule, after the Treaty of Cession, the federal government maintained the same relationship with ‘uncivilized native tribes’
as it did with Lower 48 Indian tribes. Consequently, prior Russian rule does not
suggest Alaska Natives be denied sovereign status.”).
55. See F. DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 160-61
(Nys. trans. 1917) (discussing sixteenth century claims that the native people of
the western hemisphere were “unfit to found and administer a lawful State up to
the standard required by human and civil claims”); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 841 (1990) (noting
that “Euro-Americans claimed enlarged authority over Indian communities by
erroneously suggesting that Indian bands lacked social organization and government”); see also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901). In Montoya, our
highly intellectual United States Supreme Court clearly reflected this patronizing
and ignorant view of Indian cultures, stating that
[t]he North American Indians do not and never have constituted “nations”. . . . Owing to the natural infirmities of the Indian character, their
fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, their mutual jealousies and animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental training, they have as a
rule shown a total want of that cohesive force necessary to the making up
of a nation in the ordinary sense of the word. As they had no established
laws, no recognized method of choosing their sovereigns by inheritance
or election, no officers with defined powers, their governments in their
original state were nothing more than a temporary submission to an intellectual or physical superior, who in some cases ruled with absolute
authority, and in others, was recognized only so long as he was able to
dominate the tribe by the qualities which originally enabled him to secure their leadership. In short, the word “nation” as applied to the uncivilized Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than a
compliment.
Id. at 265. The Alaska Supreme Court also stated in Metlakatla Indian Community that the Metlakatla “adapted quickly to the white man’s way of life and long
ago discarded primitive customs which served no useful purpose.” 362 P.2d at
918.
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Congress’s decision to terminate the treaty process with Indian
tribes, in 1871, meant that relations with the many Native groups in
56
Alaska would have to evolve along a different path. From the beginning, that relationship developed through the enactment of stat57
utes. For nearly a hundred years, Congress has included Alaska
Native groups within the scope of federal legislation designed to
shape federal Indian policy. The treatment of Native Alaska tribes
58
with respect to the allotment period is illustrative. Although the
allotment period began for tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight with
59
the enactment of the Dawes Act in 1888, Congress extended the
60
61
opportunity to Alaska Natives in 1906 and 1926. While the goals
of the allotment acts in Alaska were different from the allotment
62
process in the Lower Forty-Eight, the resulting effect of individualized Native ownership in land title vastly was similar. The federal
government also believed that the goal of the general allotment

56. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
57. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Antoine v. Washington, the termination of the treaty process in 1871 “meant no more, however, than that after 1871
relations with Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress and not by treaty.”
420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975).
58. The allotment process was touted as a means to assimilate Indians into a
Western civilization model of land ownership by replacing tribal land ownership
with individualized ownership. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 128-29.
59. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The premise underlying the Dawes Act was to “civilize” the Indian people and to completely eliminate Indian tribal cultures:
The aim was to do away with tribalism, with communal ownership of
land, with concentration of Indians on reservations, with the segregation
of Indians from association with good white citizens, with Indian cultural
patterns, with Native languages, with Indian religious rites and practices—in short, with anything that deviated from the norms of civilization
as practiced and proclaimed by the white reformer’s themes.
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: WRITINGS BY “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN”
1880-1900, 7-8 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973). For a comprehensive discussion on
the allotment policy, see generally DELSO SECKET OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND
THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973).
60. See Alaska Native Allotment Act, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197 (1906) (formerly
codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1, repealed with savings clause under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, Sec. 18(a), 85 Stat. 710) (1971).
The purpose of the Alaska Native Allotment Act was to extend “to the Natives of
Alaska the rights, privileges and benefits conferred by the public land laws upon
citizens of the United States.” S. DOC. NO. 101, 59 th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906).
61. See Alaska Native Townsite Act, ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629-30 (1926) (formerly
codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 730-36, repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-579, Title VII, § 703(a), 90 Stat. 2789).
62. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29.
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process, which was to disrupt tribal relations, could still be applicable to Alaska Natives.63
Following the Crow Dog decision64 and the enactment of the
65
Major Crimes Act, the Bureau of Indian Affairs implemented the
63. See S. DOC. NO. 101, supra note 59, at 6.
64. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). In the early 1880s, Crow Dog, a
Brule Sioux, killed another member of the tribe, Spotted Tail, on what is now the
Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota. See SYDNEY L. HARRING,
CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 100-01 (1994). At the time of the
killing, the tribe had no formalized court system for the resolution of disputes but
employed traditional dispute resolution through tiospayes, or extended families,
that respected each other in times of conflict. See id. at 104-05. In this case, the
tribe invoked custom and practice and resolved the killing by requiring Crow Dog
to provide certain necessities for Spotted Tail’s family, a restitution designed to
restore the loss of Spotted Tail. See id. at 105. Despite the tribe’s resolution of
the dispute, the Dakota territorial government stepped in and prosecuted Crow
Dog for murder in territorial court, where he was convicted and sentenced to
death. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and held that territorial courts of the United States were not vested
with jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by one Indian against another
within a reservation. See id. at 572. The Court also held that the Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1868 did not vest such authority in the federal government. See id.
65. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)). The Major Crimes Act was enacted to fill in a perceived
void of criminal justice in Indian country, since, for the most part, the federal government concluded that traditional tribal methods of dispute resolution were inadequate, even “lawless.” See Russell Lawrence Barsh & J. Youngblood
Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the Police Idea in American Indian Policy, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 25, 32-39 (Lawrence Rosen ed.,
1976) (discussing early colonial and federal views on the lawless nature of Indian
tribes and individuals). Contrary to these assertions, however, many tribes have
possessed notions of “the Law” and developed their own law enforcement mechanisms long before first contact with Europeans. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 553 (1976); Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikenstcher, Is
There Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal
Courts 20-21 (Boalt Hall Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 923, 1991)
(observing that most traditional Indians believe that their tribe originally had its
law or “way,” usually beginning with the creation story); see generally K.N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941) (analyzing the laws of the Cheyenne
and uncovering their “juristic beauty”).
This perception that tribes are lawless eventually worked its way through federal legislation. With the Major Crimes Act, Congress specified that certain offenses committed by one Indian against another in Indian country will be subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal or territorial courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
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“Courts of Indian Offenses” (“CIOs”)66 in 1883. These courts were
not tribal courts, but agents of assimilation that “followed laws and
regulations designed to assimilate the Indian people into both the
67
religious and jurisprudential mainstream of American society.”
One federal court noted that Alaska Natives were in a state of pu68
pilage, “similar to that of a ward to a guardian.”
The period between 1904 and 1934 saw a major shift in federal
policy toward Alaska Natives, away from ambivalence and toward
69
incorporation of traditional Indian law principles. In 1905, Judge
Wickersham of the District of Alaska held that the United States
had the right and the duty to file suit to prevent non-Natives from
acquiring land from Natives, echoing the trust responsibility that
70
had long been owed to tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight. Since this
case was initiated by the United States, it signaled a first and important pronouncement by the federal government to protect Na71
tive rights in Alaska. The shift in federal policy was evident in
1932 when the Office of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior noted the similarity between congressional treatment of
Alaska Natives and tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight and opined
that under normal federal Indian policy, the same laws should ap72
ply to Alaska Natives.
The constitutionality of Congress’s exercise of authority under the Major Crimes
Act was upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), where the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that Congress’s authority over Indian tribes was plenary by
virtue of their existence within the territorial limits of the United States. See id. at
379-81.
66. Known as CIOs or Code of Federal Regulation Courts (CFR Courts). See
B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues
in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457,
470 (1998).
67. Id. (citing WILLIAM HAGEN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 120 (1966)); cf.
SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF
SEPARATE JUSTICE 17 (1978):
[T]he reservation codes are versions of old BIA codes and models that
have undergone some localized updatings at the hands of tribal attorneys, regional BIA personnel, and/or professors from nearby universities
(non-Indian all) who—occasionally with some input from tribal (Indian)
judges or council members—have put together these curious but unquestionably Anglo-American documents.
68. In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 329 (D. Alaska 1886); see also Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
69. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 1, 10).
70. See United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442, 450 (D. Alaska 1905).
71. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 1, 10).
72. See ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at 84 (quoting Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Legal Status of Alaska Natives, 1932):
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In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act73 in
an effort to reverse the assimilationist policy behind the allotment
74
process. The Act gave “[a]ny Indian tribe . . . the right to organize for its common welfare,” the right to adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, and the right to acquire a charter of incorpo75
ration for the purpose of conducting business. Congress extended
these principles to Native communities in Alaska in 1936 and
equated the status of Alaska Natives with Native Americans gen76
erally. The subsequent promulgation of the revised Code of Indian Offenses for Indian tribes expressly recognized the rights of
Indian tribes to replace the CIO courts through the adoption of
77
their own codes of laws. Alaska’s tribes promulgated constitutions and bylaws under the provisions of the Indian Reorganization
78
Act, which could be accomplished only if Alaska’s tribes were inCongress began to directly recognize [Alaska] natives as being, to a very
considerable extent at least, under our Government’s guardianship and
enacted laws which protected them in the possession of the lands they
occupied; made provision for the allotment of lands to them in severalty,
similar to those made to the American Indians . . . . Not only has Congress in this manner treated these natives as being wards of the Government but they have been repeatedly so recognized by the courts . . . .
From this it will be seen that these natives are now unquestionably considered and treated as being under the guardianship and protection of
the Federal Government, at least to such an extent as to bring them
within the spirit, if not within the exact letter, of the laws relative to
American Indians . . . .
73. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1994).
74. See Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Groff, 729 F.2d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Robert T. Coutter, A
History of Indian Jurisdiction, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 12:
In place of the old policy [of allotment], which had to bring about assimilation, Congress substituted a new and sophisticated program which
has had the effect of “buying up” remaining Indian sovereignty by offering limited federal rights and federal economic aid in exchange for the
further relinquishment of Indian sovereignty and jurisdiction.
See also 25 U.S.C. § 461 (“No land of any Indian reservation . . . shall be allotted
in severalty to any Indian.”).
75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476(a), 477. The IRA was “specifically intended to encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government.” Fisher, 424 U.S. at 387.
76. See 25 U.S.C. § 473(a); COHEN, supra note 4, at 751-52.
77. See 25 C.F.R. § 11 (2000).
78. Between 1938 and 1950, the BIA assisted sixty-nine Alaska Native villages
in obtaining secretarial approval of IRA constitutions. See REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL-STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS SUBMITTED
TO GOVERNOR BILL SHEFFIELD, Feb. 14, 1986, Appendix A [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT] (copy on file with author). Seventy-two of Alaska’s tribes now
have IRA constitutions. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A DIRECTORY OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ALASKA OUTSIDE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS (1999),

JOHNSON_FMT.DOC

18

04/24/01 12:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:1

herently sovereign entities.79 Eventually, “tribal courts” completely
80
replaced the CFR or CIO courts.
Meanwhile, during this period, Congress had been struggling
with how to resolve disputed land claims with Alaska Natives.
Shortly after the purchase of the Alaska territory in 1867, Congress
made several unsuccessful and incomplete attempts to resolve issues concerning land rights among the Alaska Native groups. The
81
Organic Act of 1884 claimed to preserve the Indians’ interests in
82
land title, but only gave the promise of continued use and occu83
pancy to holders of aboriginal rights. When Congress enacted a
law to organize Alaska as a territory in 1958, it also included provi84
sions designed to protect Native subsistence rights.

available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/ Reports/rjdir99frame.htm [hereinafter
Dispute Resolution in Alaska].
79. It has been noted that the power to tax transactions rests not on delegated
authority from Congress, but on inherent tribal sovereignty. See Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54
(1980). The inherent sovereign power of tribal governments also allows tribes to
create court systems, whether or not the tribal constitution allows for the creation
of tribal court systems. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM,
INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW E-1, E-2 (1976).
80. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 50-51, 54-55 (1965). Authority for substituting tribal courts for CIO courts
can be found in 25 C.F.R. § 11.104 (1975).
81. 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
82. See id. § 8:
Provided, that the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be
disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons
may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress.
83. See ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at 68.
84. See Alaska Statehood Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958):
As a compact with the United States said State and its people do agree
and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to any lands or
other property not granted or confirmed to the State or its political subdivisions by or under the authority of this Act, the right and title to which
is held by the United States or is subject to disposition by the United
States, and to any lands or other property (including fishing rights), the
right or title to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts
[hereinafter called natives] or is held by the United States in trust for
said natives; shall be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States until disposed of under its authority, except to
such extent as the Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe,
and except when held by individual natives in fee without restrictions on
alienation.
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In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (“ANCSA”)85 primarily as the final resolution to disputed land
claims with Alaska Natives; however, its impetus was to clear the
86
way for development of Alaska’s oil resources in Prudhoe Bay.
The enactment of ANCSA followed decades of conflict in Alaska
between Natives and non-Natives over land rights, particularly
87
those involving hunting and fishing. While Alaska Natives may
88
have been consulted before the passage of ANCSA, their interests
ultimately were not represented because no Alaska Native delega89
tion voted in Congress. As a result, ANCSA failed to resolve
90
many issues, including the nature and reach of tribal jurisdiction.
While ANCSA was labeled a settlement of land claims, its
purpose and function was in fact directly in line with the broader
congressional policy of terminating the existence of tribes in the
United States, under which tribal governments would be de91
stroyed. The principal congressional architect of ANCSA, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, believed in the absolute assimilation of Alaska Natives and the complete elimination of tribal
92
governments and reservations. ANCSA specifically terminates all
of the reservations in Alaska with the exception of the Metlakatla

85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-29 (1994).
86. See Gigi Beradi, Natural Resource Policy, Unforgiving Geographies, and
Persistent Poverty in Alaska Native Villages, 38 NAT. RES. J. 85, 91 (1998); Marilyn
J. Ward Ford & Robert Rude, ANCSA: Sovereignty and a Just Settlement of Land
Claims or an Act of Deception, 15 TOURO L. REV. 479, 485-87 (1999).
87. For a history of these conflicts and the development of several influential
Native organizations, see generally ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 7; Ervin, supra note
34; DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKA
NATIVES AND THEIR LAND, 1867-1959 (1997); David Abraham Voluck, First Peoples of the Tongass: Law and the Traditional Subsistence Way of Life, in THE
BOOK OF THE TONGASS 53 (Carolyn Servid & Donald Snow eds., 1999).
88. See BERGER, supra note 15, at 23.
89. Cf. United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103 (1855) (observing that “whenever congress shall make [laws affecting trade and intercourse with
the Cherokee], the Cherokee nation shall be entitled to a delegate in the national
legislature”).
90. In fact, early scholarship on ANCSA failed to recognize this shortcoming.
See, e.g., Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW, supra
note 65, at 138-64 (discussing village eligibility for land selection and money, tax
consequences, application of federal securities laws, land selection issues, and
problems related to the distribution of funds).
91. For a discussion on the policy of termination, see generally Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
92. See BERGER, supra note 15, at 20.
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Reservation in the Southeast.93 But as the U.S. Supreme Court
94
noted in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, the termination process did not extinguish the existence of tribes or tribal
95
rights.
Subsequent congressional initiatives focused on increasing
tribal self-government and self-determination. Congress enacted
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
96
1975. The Self-Determination Act required the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Indian Health Service to contract, upon request,
with Indian tribes or “tribal organizations” to provide services and
97
programs to tribal members. In 1978, Congress enacted the In98
With ICWA, Congress
dian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).
sought to “protect the best interests of Indian children and to pro99
mote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”
Congress defined “Indian tribe” under ICWA to include Alaska
100
Native villages. Other self-determination legislation passed dur101
ing this period included the Indian Financing Act of 1974 and the
102
Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976. Each of these enactments, and several to come in the next twenty years, included
Alaska Native villages within their scope and described those vil103
lages as “tribes.”
Seeking to expand tribal self-determination, and faced with
the ever-increasing development of tribal court systems in the
104
United States, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act in
105
1993 to fund and strengthen tribal court systems. In passing the
Act, Congress found that “tribal justice systems are an essential
93. See 46 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994).
94. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
95. See id. at 410; WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 75-76.
96. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-58hh (1994)).
97. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(f).
98. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-63 (1994)).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
100. See id. § 1903(8) (referring to those Alaska Native villages listed in 43
U.S.C. § 1602(c)).
101. Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
1451-1544 (1994)).
102. Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-38(d) (1994)).
103. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 10, 27).
104. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)).
105. See 25 U.S.C. § 3602-11.
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part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
106
governments.” Congress also declared that it intended not to in107
terfere with the ability of tribes to dispense justice. Congress in108
cluded Alaska’s tribes within its scope.
The executive branch of the federal government also took several steps during this period to clarify the relationship with
Alaska’s tribes under federal Indian policy. Although the first list
of federally recognized tribes was published in 1979, it did not in109
110
clude any Alaska Native groups. The 1982 list included tradi111
tional councils that were identified as tribes in ANCSA, and
those that had been dealt with by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on a
government-to-government basis and councils organized under the
112
Indian Reorganization Act. These entities were included because
they paralleled those entities on the federally recognized list of

106. Id. § 3601(5).
107. See id. § 3611(d) (requiring that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed
or construed to authorize the Office [of Tribal Justice Support] to impose justice
standards on Indian tribes”); see also id. § 3631(4) (requiring that “[n]othing in
this chapter shall be construed to alter in any way any tribal traditional dispute
resolution forum”) (emphasis added).
108. See id. § 3602(3):
The term “Indian tribe” means any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or
other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native entity,
which administers justice under its inherent authority or the authority of
the United States and which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indian tribes because of their special status as Indians.
109. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364 (Oct. 21, 1993). The
preamble of the list stated that “[t]he list of eligible Alaskan entities will be published at a later date.” Id. (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 7235, 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979)). This
is mostly irrelevant, however, since there is no need for the federal government to
expressly recognize a tribe for it to retain most of the attributes of sovereignty. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “[b]ecause the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government,
the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S., 130, 149 n. 14 (1982)); see also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
110. See Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services
From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 47 Fed. Reg. 5313 (Nov. 24,
1982).
111. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(c) (1994).
112. See 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1994) (applying federal Indian law to Alaska).
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tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight.113 Then, in 1988, the list expanded
to include Native corporations formed under ANCSA as entities
114
This sparked confusion and doubt
eligible for federal services.
over what constituted a “tribe” in Alaska.
In 1993, Assistant Interior Secretary Ada E. Deer issued a
comprehensive list of federally recognized tribes that specifically
included 227 Native groups in Alaska, but did not include Native
115
corporations. Rather than merely recognizing these tribes as being eligible for federal services, the 1993 list specifically recognized
Alaska tribes as having the same status under federal Indian law as
116
those tribes in the Lower Forty-Eight. Congress codified the Ada
117
Deer list in 1994.
III. JOHN V. BAKER : MEMBER-BASED JURISDICTION AND THE
COMITY SOLUTION
One of the most significant recent developments in Alaska Native law, the John v. Baker case, began as a custody dispute between John Baker and Anita John, who were never married but
118
In July 1995, Mr. Baker, a member of the
share two children.

113. See Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services
From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,364.
114. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,829, 52,832 (Dec. 29,
1988). The rules define and describe Native Corporations, as well.
115. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,364.
116. See id. at 54,365-66:
The purpose of the current publication is to publish an Alaska list of entities conforming to the intent of 25 C.F.R. 83.6(b) and to eliminate any
doubt as to the Department’s intention by expressly and unequivocally
acknowledging that the Department has determined that the villages and
regional tribes listed below are distinctly Native communities and have
the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states . . . . This list is published to clarify that the villages and regional tribes listed below are not
simply eligible for services, or recognized as tribes for certain narrow
purposes. Rather, they have the same governmental status as other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian
tribes with a government-to-government relationship with the United
States; are entitled to the same protection, immunities, privileges as
other acknowledged tribes; have the right, subject to general principles
of Federal Indian law, to exercise the same inherent and delegated
authorities available to other tribes; and are subject to the same limitations imposed by law on other tribes.
117. See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-454, 108 Stat. 4791 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479a (1994)).
118. See Baker v. John, No. 4FA-95-3101 CI, at 1 (Alaska Super. Ct., Apr. 1,
1997) [hereinafter Baker v. John, Superior Court Decision].
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Northway Village in Alaska,119 filed a petition with the Northway
120
Tribal Court requesting sole custody. Anita John, a member of
121
the Mentasta Village, consented to the Northway Tribal Court’s
122
jurisdiction.
When the tribal court issued an order granting shared custody
123
to both parties, Mr. Baker filed an identical suit in state court.
Mr. Baker represented to the court that he was “unaware of any
custody proceeding regarding the children, except as provided
124
Although Ms.
herein, in Alaska, or in any other jurisdiction.”
John moved for dismissal based on the tribal court decision, the
Alaska Superior Court Judge in Fairbanks, Ralph R. Beistline, de125
nied her motion. The court ruled that the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) was inapplicable and that the state court’s jurisdiction
126
over the matter was superior to that of the tribe. The court then
granted full legal custody and primary physical custody to Mr.
127
Baker.
In granting the petition for review, the Alaska Supreme Court
faced a considerable quandary. It had to balance its previous deci128
sions regarding tribal court jurisdiction under ICWA with recent
federal decisions addressing the issues of tribal sovereignty and ju-

119. Unlike many villages in Alaska, Northway Village is located near a major
road system, lying on a spur road from the Alaska Highway near the Canadian
border. See The History of Northway Village, at http://arcticculture.about.com/
culture/arcticculture/library/communities/bl-NorthwayV.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2001).
120. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 743 (Alaska 1999).
121. Unlike Northway Village, Mentasta Village is a more typical Alaskan village, removed from the limited state road system. It has also been the center of
other major legal controversies regarding the self-determination of Alaska Natives. See, e.g., Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1187 (1996), reh’g granted en banc, 216 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
122. See John, 982 P.2d at 743.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See Baker v. John, Superior Court Decision, supra note 118.
126. See John, 982 P.2d at 743. ICWA requires that state courts give full faith
and credit recognition to tribal courts in the proper exercise of their jurisdiction.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994).
127. See Baker v. John, Superior Court Decision, supra note 118, at 5-7.
128. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992) (holding that the Alaska Native
groups were not entitled to treatment as sovereigns and holding that tribal courts
lacked jurisdiction over ICWA proceedings); Native Vill. of Nenana v. State,
Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986) (holding that Native
village failed to reassume jurisdiction under ICWA and was not entitled to transfer of jurisdiction).
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risdiction in Alaska.129 In particular, the Alaska Supreme Court
needed to determine if tribal courts could exercise jurisdiction over
tribal members in the absence of any territorial jurisdiction.
130

A. Applicability of ICWA and Public Law 280 to the John v.
Baker Case
To begin its analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court first revisited
two previous decisions, Native Village of Nenana v. State, Depart131
132
ment of Health & Social Services and In re F.P. Both cases dealt
133
with tribal court jurisdiction under ICWA and Public Law 280.
In Nenana, the court examined whether the Village of Nenana had
134
reassumed jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. The Nenana court interpreted the reassumption requirement articulated in
129. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
This decision, which held that land transferred to Alaska Native Corporations under ANCSA was not “Indian country” as defined by statute, has been broadly
criticized by Indian law scholars. See, e.g., David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 48 (1999) (noting that the “Venetie opinion
authored by Justice Thomas contains no references to the canons of statutory construction, even though the interpretation of two federal statutes is critical to the
decision”); Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 21, 35 (2000) (observing that Justice Thomas with his opinion
proved that “Rehnquist is not alone in his apparent indifference toward tribal
sovereignty interests”); Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law
Reflections from the Edge of the Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 442-43 (1999) (referring to the Venetie decision as an “historically superficial and intellectually deficient” decision that was “devoid of doctrinal substance, lack[ing] congressional
authorization, and [in] conflict with federal policy”); Thompson, supra note 20, at
452-53 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s deviation from the principle of inherent
tribal sovereignty and instead adopting an approach that endorsed federal allocation of power).
130. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). Public Law 280 gave to six states
(including Alaska) jurisdiction over most crimes and many civil matters throughout Indian country within the borders of the state. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). For a
detailed analysis of the statutes, see Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law
280: State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
131. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986).
132. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992).
133. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 745 (Alaska 1999).
134. See Nenana, 722 P.2d at 221. Under 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a), any Indian tribe
that became subject to state jurisdiction under Public Law 280 may try to “reassume” jurisdiction over child custody proceedings by petitioning the Secretary of
Interior.
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ICWA § 1918 to mean that Public Law 280 vested exclusive jurisdiction over child custody procedures in the state, and tribes could
regain jurisdiction only if they petitioned the Secretary of Inte135
rior. The Nenana court concluded that the Village of Nenana had
not petitioned to reassume jurisdiction and affirmed the superior
136
court’s denial of the tribe’s petition for transfer of jurisdiction.
In F.P., the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to revisit the
Nenana holding in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Native
137
Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska. The F.P. court then
reiterated its opinion that, absent a petition by the tribes to reassume jurisdiction, both Public Law 280 and ICWA vested exclusive
138
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings with the State.
Concluding that Public Law 280 and ICWA still shaped the
scope of tribal adjudicatory power, the John v. Baker court then
139
examined if these statutes were applicable to the case. The court
first noted that Congress stated that ICWA was designed “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stabil140
ity and security of Indian tribes and families.” The court found
that the dispute between John Baker and Anita John did not implicate either of these concerns because the children would still re141
The court then concluded
main part of an Indian community.
that, based on legislative history and decisions by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, ICWA did not apply to this inter-parental custody
142
dispute.
To determine whether Public Law 280 was relevant to the issue at hand, the court examined the implications of the U.S. Su143
preme Court’s recent Venetie decision. The court noted that the
Venetie decision “undermine[d] the Indian country claims of those
Alaska villages, like Northway Village, that occupy ANCSA

135. See John, 982 P.2d at 745.
136. See Nenana, 722 P.2d at 220-22.
137. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Venetie I]. The Alaska Supreme
Court in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32
(Alaska 1988), first disputed the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that Alaskan tribes
were inherently sovereign.
138. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Alaska 1992).
139. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d at 746-47.
140. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994)).
141. See id. at 747.
142. See id. at 747 & nn.31-33 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 23, 31 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546; Guidelines for State Courts; Indian
Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,587 (Nov. 26, 1979)).
143. See id. at 747-48 (discussing Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t,
522 U.S. 520 (1998)).
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lands.”144 The court concluded that if the Northway Village does
not occupy Indian country as a result of the Venetie decision, then
145
Public Law 280 had no relevance to the case. The court also declined “to reach the question of whether Nenana and its progeny
146
were wrongly decided.”
B. Post-Venetie Alaska: Endorsing Member-Based Jurisdiction of
Tribal Courts
Next, the John v. Baker court examined what, in the absence
of Indian country in a post-Venetie world, could be the basis for
tribal sovereignty. Justice Fabe, writing for the majority, focused
147
her analysis on cases discussing member-based sovereignty. The
court first noted that despite its previous rulings regarding the lack
148
of inherent sovereignty of Alaska’s tribes, the Secretary of Interior and Congress had since spoken definitively on the issue in the
149
tribes’ favor. The court observed that, while the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior, Thomas Sansonetti, evaluated the sovereign status of Alaska’s tribes based on the same historical analysis
as found in the Stevens decision, he came to a completely opposite
conclusion: that Congress and the Interior Department dealt with
150
Alaska’s Natives as through they were “tribes.” The court then
concluded that if Congress and the executive branch recognize the
151
It causovereignty of Alaska’s tribes, it “must do the same.”
tioned, however, that determining the sovereign status of Northway Village was only part of the picture—it is also important to
discern the meaning of “sovereignty” when a tribe has been
152
stripped of Indian country.
144. Id. at 748.
145. See id.
146. Id. As the discussion in this article will show, the Stevens case invited judicial review more than any other case. However, the court did not engage in that
dialogue at all.
147. Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Matthews demonstrate that this aspect of the decision created the most tension
within the court.
148. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214-15 (Alaska 1992); Native Vill. of Stevens v.
Alaska Mgmt. & Planning, 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988). The John v. Baker majority
noted that the F.P. decision was premised on the historical analysis set forth in
Stevens. See John, 982 P.2d at 749.
149. See John, 982 P.2d at 749-50 (citing Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed.
Reg. 54,364 (Oct. 21, 1993)); 25 U.S.C. § 479a (1994).
150. See John, 982 P.2d. at 749.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 750.
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The court focused considerable attention on the principles of
inherent sovereignty as espoused in United States v. Wheeler,153
which stressed that a tribe’s original sovereignty is retained subject
154
to any limitations placed upon it by Congress. Absent a limiting
statute or treaty, a tribe retains those inherently sovereign powers
155
to govern internal affairs and domestic relations. The court observed that its own previous decisions reflected a view that tribes
were sovereign, self-governing entities in “all cases where essential
156
tribal relations or rights of Indians are involved.” It concluded
that it would adopt an approach that assumed tribal sovereignty
over internal matters and domestic relations unless otherwise indi157
cated by Congress. Furthermore, the court recognized the applicability of the federal Indian law canons in determining whether
federal statutes had deprived Alaska’s tribes of this inherent sover158
eignty.
The court then concluded that ANCSA and the subsequent
federal statutes regarding tribal sovereignty supported the North153. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
154. See John, 982 P.2d at 751 (discussing Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313); see also
Buster and Jones v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905):
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms upon which
noncitizens may transact business within its borders did not have its origin in [sic] act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United States. It
was one of the inherent and essential attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute of its
government until by the agreement of the nation itself or by the superior
power of the republic it is taken from it. . . . The fact remains nevertheless that every original attribute of the government of the Creek Nation
still exists intact which has not been destroyed or limited by act of Congress or by the contracts of the Creek tribe itself.
155. See John, 982 P.2d at 751 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323-26 (1978); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). The majority
opinion notes that the dissent would prefer the opposite approach—that tribes are
only sovereign insomuch that their powers are granted by Congress. See id. at
751-52 (remarking that the dissent’s approach mistakenly relies upon selective
language in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)); see also Talton
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896); Emma R. Gross, The Origins of SelfDetermination Ideology and Constitutional Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY 125, 139 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) [hereinafter NATIVE
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY].
156. John, 982 P.2d at 751 (discussing Ollestead v. Native Vill. of Tyonek, 560
P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977)).
157. See id. at 752 & n.83 (citing In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Alaska 1992);
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)).
158. See id.
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way Tribe’s jurisdiction over child custody matters.159 The court
noted that while ANCSA sought to end the “lengthy wardship or
trusteeship,” it did not seek to strip Alaska’s tribes of their sover160
eign powers. The court added that other legislation, including the
161
162
Tribe List Act, Tribal Justice Act, and the Indian Child Welfare
163
Act, shows that Congress intended that Alaska’s tribes continue
164
to regulate their internal affairs. To do otherwise would render
meaningless the language in the Tribe List Act that expressly reserves the right of Alaska’s tribes “to exercise the same inherent
165
and delegated authorities available to other tribes.”
The court also concluded that federal case law interpreting the
scope of tribal jurisdiction supported a conclusion that Alaska’s
tribes could exercise authority over their members. Furthermore,
the court opined that federal case law supports a two-tier approach
to tribal sovereignty: that tribes exercise authority over their mem166
bers and their territory. According to the court, the opinion of
both the dissent and Mr. Baker that Indian country was a prerequisite to the exercise of sovereign tribal power ignored U.S. Supreme
Court decisions emphasizing the role tribal membership played in
159. See id. at 753.
160. Id. (quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520,
533 (1998)).
161. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 479a
(1994).
162. Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1994). The court observed that the Tribal Justice Act provides financial support to Indian tribes in order to further the development of tribal justice systems, without making distinctions between those tribes that occupy Indian country and those that do not, while
explicitly including Alaska Native villages within its scope. See John, 982 P.2d at
754 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602(3) (1994)).
163. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994). The court
noted that the purpose and structure of ICWA, passed seven years after ANCSA,
was to increase tribal control over custody decisions involving tribal children, and
that such control was essential to continued tribal sovereignty. See John, 982 P.2d
at 753. The court also observed that Alaska Native villages are explicitly included
within ICWA’s scope. See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8)).
164. See John, 982 P.2d at 753.
165. Id. (citing Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services
from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,366 (Oct.
21, 1993)).
166. See John, 982 P.2d. at 754; see generally Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing this twotier process, noting that the Supreme Court is increasingly moving away from a
geography-based approach and toward a membership-based approach to tribal
jurisdiction).
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determining the scope of tribal authority.167 The court’s analysis168
focused on several U.S. Supreme Court cases: Wheeler,169 Mon170
171
172
173
The
tana, Duro, Fisher, and to a limited degree, Kiowa.
court concluded that these cases support the notion that Alaska’s

167. See John, 982 P.2d at 755.
168. See id. at 755-59.
169. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The John court quoted
language from the Wheeler decision that discussed the limitations of tribal jurisdiction over non-members. See John, 982 P.2d at 755. According to the Wheeler
Court:
[t]hese limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with
their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But
the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only
the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as
would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
170. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The John court noted that
the Montana decision “reaffirmed the significance of tribal membership and reaffirmed the importance of Native American self-governance.” John, 982 P.2d at
755. The court noted that inherent tribal powers included “the power to punish
tribal offenders, . . . to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, . . . to prescribe rules of inheritance for members” and to
“determine rights to custody of a child of divorced parents of the tribe.” Id.
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 170 (1982)).
171. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The John court noted that the Duro
decision “emphasized the fundamental importance of membership, noting the
federal law’s consistency ‘in describing retained tribal sovereignty . . . in terms of a
tribe’s power over its members.’” John, 982 P.2d at 755 (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at
685).
172. Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976). Despite the dissent’s attempt to
use Fisher to support its conclusions, the majority noted that the Fisher decision
supported its view on the dual nature of tribal sovereignty. See John, 982 P.2d at
756. The John court noted that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Fisher was particularly concerned with how the exercise of state jurisdiction over an internal
tribal custody dispute would interfere with the tribe’s powers of self-government
and the tribal court’s legitimacy before its own people. See id. (quoting Fisher, 424
U.S. at 387-90).
173. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751
(1998). The majority opinion in John noted that the Kiowa decision “reaffirmed
the notion that the existence of Indian country is not a dispositive factor in determining jurisdiction” because the Court held that the sovereign immunity of the
tribe protected it regardless of whether contracts were formed on or off Indian
country. John, 982 P.2d at 758 (discussing Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758-59).
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tribes could exercise jurisdiction over members even without a territorial base.174
Despite this holding, the court found that Alaska state courts
175
could exercise concurrent jurisdiction over such matters. “This is
so because villages like Northway presumably do not occupy Indian country, and federal law suggests that the only bar to state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian affairs is the presence of Indian
176
The court essentially said that on one hand, Indian
country.”
country does not matter, but on the other hand, it does. The court
added that, outside of Indian country, all disputes within the State’s
borders, whether tribal or not, are within the jurisdiction of state
177
courts.
The court also noted that other state and federal decisions,
along with public policy, supported this outcome in instances where
178
one or both parents do not live on reservation land. In some circumstances, particularly because the state court system is incapable
of serving the needs of remote Native villages, the unique tribal
systems may be more appropriate to address child custody matters
179
The court concluded that
involving tribal members.
“[r]ecognizing the ability and power of tribes to resolve internal
disputes in their own forums, while preserving the right of access to
180
state courts, can only help in the administration of justice for all.”
For the final issue involving the jurisdictional implications of
its decision, the Alaska Supreme Court held that tribal law would
181
apply to child custody disputes adjudicated by tribal courts. This
conclusion was supported by the principle that tribes have the
“power to make their own substantive law in internal matters and
182
to enforce that law in their own forums,” and that such principles

174. See John, 982 P.2d at 759. The court also noted that at least one federal
judge has found that even with the passage of ANCSA, “Congress intended that
Native villages retain sovereignty over members even though such sovereignty
was ‘without territorial reach.’” See id. at 759 n.139 (Fernandez, J., concurring)
(quoting Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal
Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996)).
175. See id. at 759.
176. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973)).
177. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020(a) (LEXIS 2000)).
178. See id. at 759-60 (citing In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1998)).
179. See id. The court added that “[b]ecause of this great diversity, barriers of
culture, geography, and language combine to create a judicial system that remains
foreign and inaccessible to many Alaska Natives.” Id.
180. Id. at 760.
181. See id. at 761.
182. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978)).
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enabled tribes to “control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order.”183
C. Choosing Between Full Faith and Credit Recognition and
Comity
Once the Alaska Supreme Court determined the nature and
scope of tribal sovereignty, it next needed to evaluate to what sort
of recognition the tribal court was entitled—full faith and credit
184
recognition or comity. In determining whether to apply full faith
and credit recognition or comity to tribal court decisions, the court
first observed that, while ICWA required full faith and credit rec185
ognition to tribal court decrees, the command was not applicable
186
in this case. “Other than ICWA, no federal or state law suggests
that courts should grant full faith and credit to tribal court judg187
The court noted that the U.S. Constitution’s text and
ments.”
history failed to acknowledge Indian tribes in this context, and that
188
the Full Faith and Credit Act also limited its application to states,
189
territories, and possessions.
The court concluded that the most appropriate model for
190
Alaska would be recognition on the basis of comity. The Alaska
Supreme Court had not previously adopted a particular standard
183. Id. (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990)).
184. The term “comity” means
courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as
a matter of right, but out of deference and good will . . . . [C]ourts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (6th ed. 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court has defined comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
164 (1895). The Hilton case provides the guiding principles of comity even today.
See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
185. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994) (stating that “[t]he United States, every
State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every Indian tribe
shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any Indian tribe”).
186. See John, 982 P.2d at 761-62.
187. Id. at 762. As noted infra Part IV. A. 1, this is a complete misstatement of
the law.
188. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1994)).
189. See John, 982 P.2d at 762.
190. See id. at 763.
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for granting comity.191 In the John v. Baker decision, however, the
192
court observed several of the principles underlying comity and
appeared to adopt the standards set forth in the Restatement
193
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The court
191. The Alaska Supreme Court, referring to the “spirit of comity,” decided
that courts should give comity to legislative enactments, held that courts will ignore comity in the best interest of the child, and mentioned the aspects of “courtesy and comity.” See Sullivan v. Alaska Bar Ass’n, 551 P.2d 531, 540 (Alaska
1976) (Dimond, J., dissenting) (referring to the spirit of comity); Continental Ins.
Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 411 (Alaska 1976) (holding statutory
enactments should be given comity); DeHart v. Layman, 536 P.2d 789, 790
(Alaska 1975) (holding that courts should ignore comity in the best interest of the
child); Theodore v. State, 407 P.2d 182, 186 (Alaska 1965) (holding the rule of
competent jurisdiction is a rule of comity and courtesy rather than one of prohibition).
192. See John, 982 P.2d at 762-64.
193. In concluding that state courts should respect tribal court decisions on the
basis of comity, the Alaska Supreme Court cited the Wilson case as authority. See
id. at 763 (citing Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997)). In
Wilson, the Ninth Circuit adopted two founding principles underlying the comity
doctrine. First, the court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process comity
analysis in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810. The
Hilton Court stated that
where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant,
and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this
nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in
an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as
on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 n.4 (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03). The Wilson court
then noted that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1986) suggested two mandatory and six discretionary grounds for nonrecognition of foreign judgments. The Restatement (Third) § 482 provides:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering state
and with the rules set forth in § 421.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
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also observed that several other states have come to the conclusion
that comity is the best model for recognition of tribal court judg194
ments.
The court cautioned, however, that circumstances might exist
where state recognition of tribal court decisions would be inappropriate. First, the court noted that state courts should not recognize
tribal court judgments if the tribal court lacked personal or subject
195
matter jurisdiction. The court added that “[a] requirement that a
tribal court possess personal jurisdiction over litigants appearing
before it ensures that the tribal court will not be called upon to
adjudicate the disputes of parents and children who live far from
their tribal villages and have little or no contact with those vil196
lages.”
Next, the court found that a tribal court decision would not be
entitled to recognition if the complaining litigant was denied due
197
process. The court elaborated, noting that, in deciding whether
the tribal court complied with due process, reviewing courts should
consider whether the litigant had adequate notice and a full and
fair opportunity before an impartial tribunal “that conducted the
198
proceedings in a regular fashion.” The court cautioned that this
comity analysis did not invite “our courts to deny recognition to
tribal judgments based on paternalistic notions of proper proce(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the
judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United
States or of the State where recognition is sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign country was contrary to an agreement between the parties to submit the controversy on which the
judgment is based to another forum.
Wilson, 127 F. 3d at 810 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 48 (1986)).
194. See John, 982 P.2d at 763 n.174. It is important to note that the Alaska
Supreme Court cited a Wisconsin case in support of this assertion. See Custody of
Sengstock v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). The
State of Wisconsin has since enacted a statute requiring full faith and credit recognition by state courts of all tribal courts within state boundaries. See WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 806.245(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
195. See John, 982 P.2d at 763 (citing Wilson, 127 F.2d at 810).
196. Id.
197. See id. (citing Wilson, 127 F.2d at 810).
198. Id. (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895)).
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dure,” but that state courts should respect the “cultural differences
that influence tribal jurisprudence.”199 The court added that reviewing state courts should not deny comity recognition on the
ground that it would be too difficult to resolve the issue without as200
suming jurisdiction.
Finally, the court noted that the comity analysis would permit
state courts to deny recognition of a tribal court decree that contravened “the public policy of the United States or the forum state
201
in which recognition is sought.” The court specifically noted that
the dissent’s view, that tribal courts would attempt to circumvent
state laws and would issue decisions in violation of state public
policy, ignored the meaning of tribal sovereignty and insulted tribal
202
justice systems.
The court then remanded the case back to the superior court
with some guidance. First, the court noted that while ICWA was
inapplicable to the case, it provided the best framework for evalu203
ating whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over the case.
Next, the court declined to decide whether due process requires
204
that tribal courts provide for an appellate or review process.
While noting that authority was split on this issue, the court observed that, although an appellate procedure is required of foreign
205
courts, it is not a due process requirement for state courts.
IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND THE UNEQUIVOCAL
RECOGNITION OF TRIBES AS JURISPRUDENTIAL PARTNERS IN
ALASKA
Many groups, including the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council, have
hailed the John v. Baker decision as an important step forward for
Alaska’s tribes. While this Article agrees that the decision is indeed an important step forward, it must also assert that the step is
merely a tentative one. This section examines some of the weaknesses, or faulty premises, underlying John v. Baker as well as the
strengths of the decision. This section also offers alternatives to
the comity solution provided by the Alaska Supreme Court.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. (citing Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997)).
See id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764 (quoting Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810).
See id. at 764 & n.185.
See id. at 764.
See id.
See id. at 764 & nn.188-89.
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A. Standing on a Shaky Foundation: The Weaknesses of the John
v. Baker Decision
It is clear from reading the dialogue, or argument, between the
majority and dissenting opinions that there were vast disagreements regarding the nature of Alaska’s tribes, their role as members of a judicial family, and their ability to exercise jurisdiction.
As a result of these almost bitter differences, the majority most certainly had to walk a fine line.
1. Full Faith and Credit Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions. While the majority opinion, for the most part, presented a
well-reasoned judicial pronouncement, it came somewhat short in
its discussions of full faith and credit recognition of tribal courts.
The majority’s assertion that “[o]ther than ICWA, no federal or
state law suggests that courts should grant full faith and credit to
206
tribal court judgments” was unsupported.
Federal courts have long held that tribal court decisions are
207
Congress has simientitled to full faith and credit recognition.
208
larly required such recognition in numerous circumstances. Additionally, several states have enacted statutes requiring either

206. John, 982 P.2d at 762.
207. See Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (8th Cir. 1894) (concluding that
judgments by tribal courts on cases within their jurisdiction “stand on the same
footing with those of the courts of the territories of the Union and are entitled to
the same faith and credit”); Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe, 129 F.Supp. 15, 21
(W.D.S.D. 1955) (“Courts have uniformly held that the decisions of Indian tribal
courts, rendered within their jurisdiction, territorial and personal, and according
to the forms of law recognized by the tribe, are entitled to full faith and credit.”)
(citations omitted).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) (domestic violence protective orders); 25
U.S.C. § 1911 (1994) (child custody orders); id. § 483a (1994) (management of
trust lands); id. § 3106(c) (1994) (forest trespass regulation); id. § 3713(c) (1994)
(Indian agricultural lands trespass); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (child custody
determinations); id. § 1738B (1994) (child support orders); id. § 1738C (tribes and
states need not accord full faith and credit to marriages between homosexual
couples). The current version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (Alaska’s remaining portions can be found at ALASKA STAT. §§
25.30.300-360 (LEXIS 2000)), does not include territorial disputes between a state
court and tribal court. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has suggested amendments to the Act to include tribal court orders. See B.J.
Jones, A Primer on Tribal Court Civil Practice, at http://www.court.state.nd.us/
Court/Resource/Tribal.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
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across-the-board full faith and credit recognition209 or have limited
210
that recognition to a particular subject matter. Other states have
211
extended full faith and credit through judicial decisions. Finally,
many states have addressed the issue through modifications to their
212
rules of court, often after a series of forums consisting of meet213
ings between state and tribal court representatives.
Whether or not reciprocity is required varies from state to
state. Some states require tribal court recognition of state court
214
215
decisions, while others do not. Tribal governments have even
209. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (MICHIE 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
806.245 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
210. See Rules of Procedure for the Enforcement of Tribal Court Civil Judgments, in ARIZ. R. CT. 87; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-302 (Michie 1998) (affecting
full faith and credit to domestic abuse protection); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, §
1 (Supp. 2000) (allowing protection orders under the federal Violence Against
Women Act); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:13(III) (Supp. 2000) (domestic violence protective orders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-5.1 (Supp. 2000) (providing for
protection orders in voter registration); id. § 40-13-6 (domestic violence protective
orders); N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 154-e (2000) (defining “protection order issued by
another jurisdiction” to include orders issued by tribal courts); H.B. 1181, 1995
Sess. (Pa. 1996) (providing for recognition of protection orders); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-16-80(E) (Supp. 2000) (intentional and negligent torts committed on the reservation); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Michie Supp. 2000) (affording protection
orders).
211. The New Mexico Supreme Court has suggested that the phrase “states,
territories, and possessions” includes Indian tribes and that full faith and credit
should therefore be applied to tribal court proceedings. See Jim v. CIT Financial
Svcs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 1975). The Washington State Supreme Court
relied on the Jim decision when holding that where a tribal court is properly exercising its jurisdiction, it is entitled to full faith and credit. See In re Buehl, 555 P.2d
1334, 1342 (Wash. 1976). The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated “[j]udgments of
tribal courts, as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded
in some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.” Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.21 (1978).
212. See MICH. CT. R. 2.615; N.D. R. CT. 7.2; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2, APP.
R. 30 (West 2000); WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 82.5; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10
(Michie 2000). While the North Dakota rule limits recognition to tribal courts
within state boundaries, the other cited rules recognize any court order from a
federally recognized tribe. See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245(1) (West Supp.
2000) (limiting recognition to tribes within the State of Wisconsin).
213. See generally Hon. Michael F. Cavanagh, Michigan’s Story: State and
Tribal Courts Try to Do the Right Thing, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999).
214. See MICH. CT. R. 2.615; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2, App. R. 30; WASH.
SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 82.5; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245(1)(e), 806.245(6).
215. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith
and Credit Act extends to tribal courts. See Jim, 533 P.2d at 752. However, the
Navajo Court of Appeals has held that it will only recognize state court decisions
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enacted laws requiring full faith and credit recognition of state
court decisions.216
As certain as the winters are long in Alaska, federal courts and
several states do acknowledge that full faith and credit is the preferred means for recognizing tribal courts. To be fair to the court’s
analysis, however, it is certainly a mixed and unsettled issue. There
is no hard line of cases that clearly points to full faith and credit
recognition. Nonetheless, the court could have prepared a more
balanced analysis of the policy questions involved. Instead of
merely concluding that the law does not require full faith and credit
recognition, the court could have invited the Alaska State Legislature to explore the merits of the issue. The court did not, however,
examine the merits underlying full faith and credit recognition of
tribal courts.

on the basis of comity. See In re Guardianship of Chewiwi, 1 Nav. R. 120, 126
(Nav. Ct. App. 1977).
216. See, e.g., 24 MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. § 3001 (West 1996); Order
Adopting Standards for Recognition of Judicial Proceedings of Other Sovereigns
in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Courts: Full Faith and Credit, 3 Okla. Trib. Ct.
Rep. 211, 214-15, 1993 WL 831883 (Muskogee (Creek) 1993). Some scholars suggest that this reciprocity by tribes is not warranted. See generally Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty,
Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28
N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998).

JOHNSON_FMT.DOC

38

04/24/01 12:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:1

2. The Burden of Proof in Evaluating Comity Recognition of
Tribal Courts. While external political pressures may force comity
217
recognition of foreign-country acts, no such pressure has been
placed on Alaska courts to recognize tribal courts. It is often easier
for state courts to ignore tribal court decisions than to undertake
the difficult task of interpreting and applying unfamiliar tribal
218
law. It may also be easier for state courts to ignore tribal court
decisions out of some underlying, yet mistaken, belief that tribal
219
Even though the Alaska Sucourts are inherently illegitimate.
preme Court attempted to preempt this problem by providing instructions on the matter, its instructions were not entirely clear.
The recent remand decision by Judge Beistline in John v. Baker
exemplifies this problem.
On remand, Judge Beistline acknowledged the Alaska Supreme Court’s instructions and recognized that “state courts and
220
Judge Beistline
tribal courts have much to offer one another.”
found that the Northway Tribal Court had jurisdiction because the
father was a member of the tribe and the children were eligible for
221
membership.
Judge Beistline concluded, however, that Mr. Baker “did not
receive the necessary due process protection required to satisfy the
222
Following the three factors identified by the
comity doctrine.”
223
Alaska Supreme Court, Judge Beistline examined the Northway
Tribal Court’s appellate procedures and concluded that they were
adequate. He also concluded that Mr. Baker was given adequate
notice of the proceedings.224
However, Judge Beistline reasoned that due process was not
afforded to Mr. Baker because he “was not granted a fair and full
opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal that con217. See James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause—Its History
and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224, 225 (1955).
218. See Gordon K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1409 (1985).
219. See NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN
COURTS AND THE FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NAICJA LONG RANGE PLANNING
PROJECT 80-81 (1978).
220. Baker v. John, Order Denying Comity, 4FA-95-3103 (Alaska Super. Ct.,
Aug. 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Baker v. John, Remand Decision].
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763-64 (Alaska 1999). These factors are
presence of an appellate procedure, proper and timely notice of all proceedings,
and fair and full opportunity to litigate before an impartial tribunal that conducted
its proceedings in a “regular fashion.”

224 See Baker v. John, Remand Decision, supra note 220.
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ducted its proceedings in a regular fashion.”225 Judge Beistline
noted what he believed were several irregularities that pointed to
favoritism on the part of the court for Ms. John. First, Judge Beistline observed that Judge Titus of the Northway Tribal Court contacted Nora David, the First Chief of Mentasta, to see if Mentasta
226
would like to participate or exercise jurisdiction. Judge Beistline
noted that several of the witnesses speaking on behalf of Ms. John
were her relatives or people who provided care for the children
227
while they were in Ms. John’s custody. The court also concluded
that the proceedings were conducted more like a mediation than an
228
Finally, Judge Beistline observed conflicting eviadjudication.
dence between the two sides, choosing to resolve the conflict in fa229
vor of Mr. Baker.
Judge Beistline’s observations are flawed fundamentally for
several reasons. First, Judge Beistline chose to read some improper motive behind the communication between the Northway
Tribal Court and the First Chief of the Mentasta Council. However, if such communication had been made by a state court judge
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, it would have
230
Second, the remand decision also
been seen as commonplace.
failed to acknowledge that “[c]omity does not require that a tribe
utilize judicial procedures identical to those used in United States
231
Although Judge Beistline parroted the language from
courts.”
the Alaska Supreme Court on this point, he later criticized the
Northway Tribal Court for conducting the proceedings in a manner
more like a mediation than an adjudication. It is well known that
many Native cultures, including some of Alaska’s Native groups,

225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Former ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.060(d) provided that
[b]efore determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court
may communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a
view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the parties.
See also Rogers v. Rogers, 907 P.2d 469, 471 (Alaska 1995) (noting that the “superior court concluded, after speaking with the judge presiding over the Arkansas
proceeding, that Arkansas was a more convenient forum for the child custody
proceeding”); Crews v. Crews, 769 P.2d 433, 435 (Alaska 1989) (observing that the
“purpose of this statute is to avoid jurisdictional competition and ensure that two
states do not simultaneously adjudicate the custody of a child”).
231. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).

JOHNSON_FMT.DOC

40

04/24/01 12:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:1

traditionally prefer mediation-style dispute resolution to our adversarial system.232
Judge Beistline’s evidentiary decisions seem designed to avoid
recognizing the tribal court’s decision. Judge Beistline appears to
believe that Mr. Baker was deprived of an impartial tribunal because several tribal council members who testified on behalf of Ms.
John were relatives. Ms. John and several council members testified that their roles were solely as witnesses, while Mr. Baker as233
serted that they helped to shape the proceedings. Judge Beistline
resolved the conflict in Mr. Baker’s favor based solely on Mr.
Baker’s testimony, despite the weight of evidence to the contrary
as seen in testimony from numerous other witnesses. The court’s
decision to resolve conflicting evidence based on Mr. Baker’s lone
assertions is most disturbing since Mr. Baker had previously lied to
the court when he asserted that he was “unaware of any custody
proceeding regarding the children, except as provided herein, in
Alaska, or any other jurisdiction” in the affidavit required under
234
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
It is indeed important for all litigants to be ensured the full
protections provided by due process. But any fears about proper
due process or equal protection are covered under the Indian Civil
235
Rights Act (“ICRA”), thus removing the need for overzealous
judicial paternalism. Furthermore, it may even be entirely inappropriate for state courts to exercise the level of scrutiny shown on
remand in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Santa
236
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, in which the Court held that, through
ICRA, Congress intended to limit review of tribal court decisions.
Perhaps when the Alaska Supreme Court discusses this issue on
round two it should consider placing the burden of proof squarely
232. See generally Robert D. Garrett, Mediation in Native America, 49 DISP.
RESOL. J. 38 (1994).
233. See Baker v. John, Remand Decision, supra note 220.
234. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 743 (Alaska 1999).
235. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994) (providing that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall . . . (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 81
(1980) (requiring a judgment to be valid before it can be given full faith and
credit); id. § 1 (enumerating standards for valid judgment); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 92 (1971) (setting forth the standards for a
valid judgment).
236. 436 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1978); see also Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that, under ICRA, federal courts should not review the merits of a dispute that
is properly within tribal court jurisdiction).
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on the objecting party to show, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the tribal court’s actions violated due process.237 Under such
an approach, courts would begin their analysis with the presumption that a tribal court’s decision is valid, certainly the respect deserving of another sovereign.
B. Bright Spots in the Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision:
Acknowledging Member-Based Jurisdiction for Tribal Courts
in Alaska
1. The John v. Baker Decision Vindicated Justice Rabinowitz’s Decision in Stevens. Despite acknowledging federal
authority regarding the sovereignty of Alaska’s tribes, the Alaska
Supreme Court failed either to overrule explicitly or call into question its contrary prior decisions, particularly Native Village of Stev238
In John v. Baker, the
ens v. Alaska Management & Planning.
court stated it was “[in]appropriate at this time to reach the question of whether Nenana and its progeny were wrongfully de239
That progeny includes In re F.P., in which the Alaska
cided.”
Supreme Court refused to accept the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
that tribes in Alaska were sovereign, relying solely on the historical
240
analysis set forth in Stevens. However, by deferring to congres241
sional and federal executive authority on the issue, the Alaska
Supreme Court finally has recognized what Justice Rabinowitz
urged in the Stevens decision: that federal recognition and tribal
sovereignty are issues best left to the federal government for de237. See, e.g., Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 283-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
when conducting habeas corpus review, principles of comity require federal courts
to presume that state court proceedings were legitimate and not to disturb state
court findings of historical fact absent “clear and convincing evidence”).
238. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
239. John, 982 P.2d at 748.
240. In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Alaska 1992).
241. See John, 982 P.2d at 749 (“If Congress or the Executive Branch recognizes a group of Native Americans as a sovereign tribe, we ‘must do the same.’”)
(citation omitted); see also Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 163 (Alaska 1977)
(“Because of the supremacy of federal law, we are bound to recognize the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, even if we were to find valid public policy reasons to hold it inapplicable in this case.”). But see Hon. Monroe Gunn McKay,
Keynote Address, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 5:
I know it is more common than not for us to hate and resent the asset of
territorial control. It asserts itself in the form of sovereign immunity.
When sovereign immunity works against us, we think it a terrible thing.
On the other hand, when we the states prevail because the federal courts
dismiss a claim under the eleventh amendment (state sovereign immunity), we think sovereign immunity is a wonderful thing.
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termination. This recognition of federal supremacy on this issue is
important as state courts frequently misconstrue the nature and
242
origin of tribal sovereignty.
In Stevens, the Alaska Supreme Court examined the historical
relationship between Alaska’s tribes and the federal government
and concluded that Congress has never recognized the sovereign
243
status of Alaska’s tribes. The court also adopted prior language
from the Metlakatla decision, stating that there were not “tribes” in
244
Alaska as that term is commonly understood. The analysis fails
to recognize the distinction between inherent sovereignty and federal recognition. Inherent sovereignty is relevant to understanding
the source of a tribe’s self-governing powers, while federal recognition relates to whether a tribe is eligible to receive certain types of
federal funding.
In his dissent in Stevens, Justice Rabinowitz, relying on traditional canons of interpretation that pertain to legislation affecting
245
Indian tribes, disagreed with the majority’s outcome, concluding
instead that Congress had not waived the tribe’s sovereign immu246
nity. Justice Rabinowitz also disagreed with the court’s conclusion that a tribe could not avail itself of sovereign immunity if it
had not been expressly recognized by Congress or the executive
247
branch of the federal government. He noted that several federal
courts, and even the Alaska Supreme Court, had previously re248
jected this approach. Justice Rabinowitz added that the majority’s approach flaunted the established principle of inherent tribal
242. See, e.g., Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (labeling the notion that tribes are sovereign entities as a “ridiculous pretense”). In his dissent, Judge James Randall added that since tribes are within the
boundaries of the United States, they cannot be sovereign. See id. at 383 (noting
that “[o]ur neighbors to the north and south are, in every sense of the word, true
sovereign states or sovereign nations. The reason is simple. They are not in the
United States.”).
243. See Stevens, 757 P.2d at 35-40.
244. See id. at 35-36 (quoting Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve
v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 917-18 (Alaska 1961)).
245. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’”) (citation omitted); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
392 (1976) (“statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to
be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.”).
246. Stevens, 757 P.2d at 43-45 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 45.
248. See id. at 45-46 (discussing Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska
1977)).
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sovereignty.249 Justice Rabinowitz concluded that while the federal
government had never recognized any tribes in Alaska expressly,
250
neither had it denied sovereign immunity expressly.
While not renouncing the Stevens decision explicitly, the
Alaska Supreme Court finally has put to rest any serious debate on
the issue of tribal sovereignty in Alaska. It solidly built its decision
on the principles outlined in Atkinson v. Haldane; that is, that
courts should defer to the appropriate political branches and the
federal government on the question. While put down quietly, the
flawed analysis of Stevens and Metlakatla has been put to sleep at
last.
2. Alaska’s Tribes Still Retain Jurisdiction Based on Tribal
Membership. Over a vigorous dissent, the Alaska Supreme Court
stated in John v. Baker that the Venetie decision indicated that
251
Public Law 280 is not relevant to the outcome of the case.
Rather, the court observed, the more relevant approach was to examine the authority a tribal government may exert over its mem252
bers. Contrary to the dissent’s selective reading of the law, the
principle of inherent tribal sovereignty, when combined with the
Venetie decision and recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that increasingly move toward member-based sovereignty, requires that
tribes in Alaska retain jurisdiction over their members under certain circumstances.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes retain “attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their terri253
tory” and that such sovereignty is “dependent on, and subordi249. See id. at 46-47.
250. See id. at 49.
251. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 765 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, C.J., and
Compton, J., dissenting). The dissent totals nearly fifty pages of the seventy-sixpage opinion, representing what is known to have been a bitter disagreement
among the justices over the disposition of the case. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Matthews disputes the existence of inherent sovereignty, argues that tribal courts
cannot exercise jurisdiction over their members absent a territorial base, asserts
that federal executive authority regarding tribal court jurisdiction was irrelevant,
claims that the canons of construction do not apply, and argues that allowing tribal
courts jurisdiction over nonmembers would be impermissible. This Article only
indirectly addresses a few of the points raised in the dissent because it reflects a
selective application of federal Indian law principles, promotes a selective reading
of history and, as the majority opinion notes, “ignore[s] the fundamental meaning
of sovereignty and insult[s] tribal systems of justice to reason that because tribal
law is different it is inferior.” Id. at 764.
252. See id. at 748-59.
253. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
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nate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.”254 If we subtract “territory” from that equation, as the Venetie court inexplica255
bly has, then Alaska’s tribes retain sovereignty over their mem256
bers.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in United States v.
257
Wheeler, “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty
258
not withdrawn by treaty or statute.” The Court then noted that
nothing in the Navajo treaties with the United States or in federal
259
statutes had deprived the tribe of jurisdiction over its members.
Even though the Court maintained that tribal sovereignty was both
a function of territory and membership, it focused its discussion on
the connection between sovereignty and membership because a

254. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
255. The Venetie Court did more than declare that Indian country does not exist in these lands, for the impact of its analysis was to declare that tribes were hamstrung in their ability to self-govern. Courts have long held that Indian tribes have
the power, absent some treaty provision or act of Congress to the contrary, to enact their own laws for the government of their people, and to establish courts to
enforce them. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that exercise of
state jurisdiction would undermine tribal authority over reservation affairs); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding tribal courts to be, at least
in part, “arms of the federal government”); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of
Pine Ridge Res., 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that the tribe passed on inherent taxation powers). Essentially what the Venetie court did was hold that
Congress has extinguished the rights of Alaska’s tribes to self-govern without
making an explicit finding to support the conclusion.
The outcome of Venetie not only flies in the face of logic, but directly contradicts previous Supreme Court pronouncements on the limits of state civil authority over tribes. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 208 (1987) (noting that, in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), “[w]e
recognized that a grant to States of general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result in the destruction of tribal institutions and values”); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 218 (1974) (noting that Congress has consistently treated
Alaska Native village land as “on or near a reservation” for the purpose of several
federal statutes).
256. In his dissent, Chief Justice Matthews contends that it was impossible for
tribes to assert jurisdiction absent a territorial base. However, the dissent ignores
Supreme Court case law that distinguishes between jurisdiction over tribal members and jurisdiction over territory. See John, 982 P.2d at 782 (Matthews, C.J., and
Compton, J., dissenting).
257. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
258. Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978)).
259. See id. at 324.
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tribal member was involved.260 The Wheeler Court also stated that
the “right of self-government” included the right to enact laws applicable to tribal members and the right to exercise authority over
261
internal relations. The Court later asserted in Duro v. Reina that
“[i]t is undisputed that the tribes retain jurisdiction over their
members,” subject to matters over which federal courts might ex262
ercise concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, Duro and Wheeler strongly
suggest that tribes may exercise jurisdiction over the internal relations of their members in the absence of territorial-based jurisdic263
tion.
This conclusion is also supported by Organized Village of
264
Kake v. Egan. In Kake, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed, with
approval, a previous case that held that a non-Indian who was accused of murdering another non-Indian on a Montana reservation
265
could be prosecuted only in state courts. This analysis reflects a
view that it is the membership, or non-membership, of a party that
influences the tribe’s ability to exercise jurisdiction, not whether
the dispute arose within Indian country. Similarly, Venetie would
not prohibit a tribal court from prosecuting tribal members for
266
purely tribal offenses.
For those individuals who willingly submit to the tribal court’s
267
jurisdiction but are not members of the tribe, the limited applica-

260. See id. at 323-24.
261. See id. at 322, 326. See also Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469,
1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that attempts to enforce tribal ordinances against
tribal members are the “staple of tribal courts”); Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian
Cmty., 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1981).
262. 495 U.S. 676, 681 n.1 (1990).
263. See Dussias, supra note 166, at 49.
264. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
265. See id. at 68 (discussing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896)).
266. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (noting that this
aspect of sovereignty is not surrendered). The Wheeler Court added that the surrender of sovereignty occurs only when tribes attempt to assert jurisdiction over
non-members.
267. The John v. Baker dissent spends considerable time expounding on how
distasteful it would be for tribes in Alaska, absent Indian country, to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-members. Under standard rules of civil procedure,
however, a court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a party that
willingly submits itself to the court’s authority. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.010
(LEXIS 2000) (“The voluntary appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint upon the defendant.”);
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. English Bay Vill. Corp.,
781 P.2d 6, 9 (Alaska 1989) (“A court acquires personal jurisdiction over one who
appears without challenging jurisdiction.”). Absent the distasteful application of a
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tion of the rationale developed in Montana v. United States268 would
be warranted. In Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
tribe could not exercise jurisdiction over a non-member’s activities
269
in Indian country unless certain conditions were met. Under the
first condition, the Court held that a tribe could exercise jurisdiction over non-members “who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
270
Under the second condition, a
leases, or other arrangements.”
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians “when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
271
or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
Application of the Montana principles is not apparent immediately since they dealt with jurisdiction over fee title land within a
reservation. Yet, if these exceptions are based on the principle of
inherent sovereignty and tribes are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians under these circumstances, then most certainly a tribe should be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over
members when the situation affects the “political integrity, the
272
Even
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
then, an Alaska tribe’s ability to exercise some limited forms of jurisdiction over its ANCSA lands may not be as remote a possibility
as commentators think. A recent D.C. Circuit opinion regarding
the ability of the Pueblo to exercise authority under Environmental
double standard, these principles should apply to tribal courts as well. To analogize to Chief Joseph’s comments quoted at the beginning of this Article, justice
can be achieved in Alaska only when state courts treat tribes with the respect they
give each other.
On a similar note, one of the weakest arguments in opposition to tribal courts
exercising jurisdiction over non-members is that such individuals are not allowed
to vote, hold office, or serve on a jury in that court. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 688 (1990), superseded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994). This once again
illustrates that the standards change when state or federal courts examine the
authority of tribal courts. Under state and federal rules of civil procedure, a nonresident visiting or doing business in another state, if meeting the proper tests,
may normally be subject to the jurisdiction of the state he is visiting, although he
may not be able to vote, hold office, or sit on a jury. This has been a long-standing
foundation of civil jurisdiction for state and federal courts in this country, but the
same respect is not granted to tribal courts. If the same limitations were placed on
state courts that are on tribal courts in this context, state courts would cry foul.
268. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
269. See id. at 565.
270. Id. (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
272. Id.

JOHNSON_FMT.DOC

2001]

04/24/01 12:00 PM

A COMITY OF ERRORS

47

Protection Agency regulations over tribal trust lands in nonreservation areas might have implications in Alaska.273
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent focus on member-based sov274
ereignty instead of territorial-based sovereignty, while detrimental to tribes on reservations with checkerboard jurisdiction, actually
275
works to the advantage of Alaska’s tribes. These decisions tend
to diminish the authority of the tribe over non-members residing
within the reservation, but in Alaska, they would allow the tribe effectively to extend its jurisdiction over members in the absence of
Indian country or a reservation system. As the concurring opinion
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia noted, the powers of self276
government rest with the sovereign, not with the land.
C. Full Faith and Credit as a Mechanism for Furthering Justice in
Alaska’s Rural Communities
Indian tribes do not exist in a vacuum outside our constitu277
tional framework of federalism. Many of the twentieth century’s
273. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Environmental. Prot. Agency, 211 F.3d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 2000). The D.C. Circuit reasoned that since the U.S. Supreme Court
has found no distinction between “reservation” and “tribal trust lands” with regard to sovereign immunity, it was not improper for the EPA, in promulgating the
“Tribal Authority Rule,” to allow the Pueblo to propose tribal implementation
plans under the Clean Air Act for tribal trust lands outside the reservation. See id.
at 1294. The court added that when a tribe can demonstrate inherent sovereignty
over an area, and an activity would threaten the “health or welfare of the tribe,”
then it would be appropriate for the tribe to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 1295
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
274. See generally Dussias, supra note 166.
275. I must emphasize that it is not at all preferential for Alaska’s tribes to be
stripped of their territorial jurisdiction. Since the Supreme Court has deemed it
necessary to eradicate Indian country in Alaska, however, tribes must make use of
what remains—assertion of sovereignty over tribal members.
276. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 27 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson made the following analogy:
[The Indians’] condition is something like that of the Israelites, when inhabiting the deserts. Though without land that they can call theirs in the
sense of property, their right of personal self government . . . may exist
though the land occupied be in fact that of another. The right to expel
them may exist in that other, but the alternative of departing and retaining the right of self government may exist in them. And such they certainly do possess; it has never been questioned, nor any attempt made at
subjugating them as a people, or restraining their personal liberty except
as to their land and trade.
277. See WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 103 (“Indian tribes are part of the constitutional structure of government”); Gross, supra note 155, at 134 (observing that
the American Indian Policy Review Commission viewed tribes as having the same
sovereignty as states and local governments); Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor, Les-
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decisions regarding civil jurisdiction reflect a belief that states and
tribes both exist as part of the national court system.278 Tribal
courts have long been recognized as important forums for resolving
279
personal disputes of both Indians and non-Indians. Tribal courts
are also important forums for the preservation of traditional tribal
values and are a practical option for many of Alaska’s tribes, particularly since the state court system operates mostly in urban areas
280
In contrast, most of the more than one
and hub communities.
hundred tribal courts and councils involved in resolving disputes in
281
Alaska are located in the rural areas.
Courts and scholars alike have made several arguments in
support of extending full faith and credit to Indian tribes generally.
One of these arguments is based on the Full Faith and Credit
282
Act. Proponents of this argument suggest that tribes constitute
283
“territories” for the purpose of the statute. In reference to this
sons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997)
(“Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign entities—the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes.”); see generally Richard Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U.
TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994).
278. See Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118, 118-25 (1995).
279. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978); Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976).
280. See LISA JAEGER, TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK 2 (Alicemary Closuit ed., 2d
ed. 1991).
281. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 10, 91). The vast
majority of dispute resolution among village members is handled by tribal councils, not the courts—Alaska only has twenty-three tribal courts handling disputes
outside of tribal councils. See Dispute Resolution in Alaska, supra note 78, at 1.
282. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
283. United States ex rel Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103 (1856) (noting that
despite the differences between Indian territories and territories organized to later
become states, there “is no reason why the laws and proceedings of the Cherokee
territory, so far as relates to rights claimed under them, should not be placed upon
the same footing as other territories in the Union. It is not a foreign, but a domestic territory,—[sic] a territory which originated under our constitution and laws.”);
Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1897) (noting that the courts of the
Cherokee Nation “are entitled to all the faith and credit accorded to the judgments and decrees of territorial courts”); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902
(Idaho 1982) (agreeing with the decisions of previous courts “which have found
the phrase ‘Territories and Possessions’ broad enough to include Indian tribes, at
least as they are presently constituted under the laws of the United States”); Jim v.
CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 1975); In re Adoption of Buehl v.
Anderson, 555 P.2d 1334, 1342 (Wash. 1976). But see Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc.,
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argument, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that tribal courts,
when acting properly within their jurisdiction, are under some cir284
cumstances entitled to full faith and credit recognition. This argument unfortunately seeks to force tribes into an established box.
Rather than attempting to shape tribes either into states or territories, courts and Congress should simply recognize tribal governments for what they are: unique members of an evolving federal285
ism.
Most of the opposition to recognizing tribal courts through
application of full faith and credit principles stems from an overly
inflexible reading of the Constitution and a lack of awareness
about the increasing role that tribal courts are playing in our modern federalism. Those who criticize the extension of full faith and
credit to tribal court decisions assert that such recognition is inappropriate because tribal governments were not mentioned specifically in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of the U.S.
286
Constitution. This argument ignores the increasing treatment by
287
Congress of Indian tribes as governments similar to states, and
571 P.2d 689, 694-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (tribal decrees entitled to comity but
not full faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App.
1975); Fred L. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for
Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. Rev. 133, 135-38 (1977).
284. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.21 (1978) (citing
United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100 (1856)).
285. See Gross, supra note 155, at 136 (noting that the constitution recognizes
that Indian tribes were to be dealt with as separate political entities, distinct from
states or foreign nations); see generally Frank Pommersheim, “Our Federalism” in
the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal
Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (2000).
286. See U.S. CONST. art IV, §1. These arguments also fail to mention that
there was little to no debate over the enactment of the Full Faith and Credit Act
which implemented the clause. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—
The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 nn.22-23 (1945).
Jackson adds that the members of the Constitutional Convention or the early
Congresses “had [little] more than hazy knowledge of the problems they sought to
settle or of those which they created by the full faith and credit clause.” Id. at 6.
Even though tribes were not part of the original agreement that created the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, they have since evolved as a distinct aspect of our modern federalism. See also Tom LeClaire, Full Faith and Credit and Tribal Court
Judgments, in COURSE MATERIALS, 24th ANNUAL FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
INDIAN LAW CONFERENCE 3 (Apr. 8-9, 1999).
287. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k)
(1994); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1994); Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
300j-11(a) (1994). See generally Teresa A. Williams, Pollution and Hazardous
Waste on Indian Lands: Do Federal Laws Apply and Who May Enforce Them?, 17
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betrays the purpose behind full faith and credit recognition, which
is that the many sovereign members of our federalist structure
should exist in cooperation. The Full Faith and Credit Clause was
implemented to make each state an integral part of one nation, to
establish one country with equal privileges accorded to the citizens
of the many states, and to unify the states rather than have the
states act as independent nations free to ignore the judicial pro288
ceedings of others. The argument also ignores the long-standing
principle that Indian tribes are not foreign governments, to which
289
comity recognition normally is applied.
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269 (1992) (providing further analysis of these provisions and
their tribes-as-states provisions). An amendment was introduced in a recent congressional session that would formally include tribes in Endangered Species Act
provisions related to recovery efforts and cooperative agreements. See H.R. 2351,
105th Cong. (1998).
288. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was “to
transform the several States from independent sovereignties into a single, unified
Nation”); Sumner, supra note 217, at 241-42. Otherwise, the states would coexist
in the manner they did under the Articles of Confederation, with each state free to
make its own determination as to the validity of judgments from other colonies
and only recognizing judgments under the discretionary comity standard. See id.
at 246.
The concept has an indirect application to the relationship between states and
tribes. States and tribes co-exist as part of a federal structure, but they are not
“sister states” in the sense imagined by the Constitution, nor are the more than
500 Indian tribes in any way similar to one another. See P.S. Deloria & Robert
Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 378-79
(1994); see also Daina B. Garonzik, Comment, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts
from a Federal Courts Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and
Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723, 725 (1996) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause
clearly governs only sister state pronouncements. Yet Congress intended to entitle the decisions of all courts within the federal system to full faith and credit by
enacting the Full Faith and Credit Act.”); Resnik, supra note 278, at 118
(“[E]quation of states and tribes would be erroneous, for profound differences of
history, sociology, and politics exist between the two.”).
289. It is important to note once again that the Alaska Supreme Court relied
primarily on the Ninth Circuit’s Wilson decision for its analytical approach to applying comity recognition to tribal court decisions. One commentator has noted
the fallacy of the Wilson analysis as follows:
Wilson does not note nor lend any significance to the procedural safeguards already in place within our federal system. It improperly equates
tribes with foreign nations for judgment recognition purposes, ignoring
the fact that United States already exhibits controls on the tribal courts
process, with the ICRA and guaranteed federal question review under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Likewise, Wilson fails to grasp that the concerns ad-
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Those who fear the restrictions on state sovereignty that
granting full faith and credit to tribal courts might impose should
be reminded of the words of Chief Justice Stone, that “the full faith
290
and credit clause is not an inexorable and unqualified command.”
Reviewing courts are still permitted to determine whether the
291
The Full Faith and Credit
originating court had jurisdiction.
Clause is a statement about how we view the nature of our system
of federalism, where each member stands on the ground of mutual
respect. If we consider tribal governments as equal partners with
states in our federalist structure, then there is no room for comity.
The current patchwork system of granting recognition to tribal
courts on the basis of comity lacks the predictability and stability
offered by full faith and credit recognition and allows state courts
to make value judgments about the viability of tribal sovereignty
292
and the validity of tribal courts themselves.
Moreover, as a practical matter, full faith and credit recognition of tribes would further justice in rural Alaska by providing a
forum of finality for Alaska’s rural litigants. The Alaska Court
293
Additionally, as disSystem has recognized this contribution.
dressed in Hilton and the Restatements are already embodied in the federal system.
Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 338-39 (2000). Federal courts also
recognize state court decisions regarding state law on the basis of comity, see Bush
v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 534, __ U.S. __ (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and
Thomas, J.J., concurring), and tribal court decisions, see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 n.8 (1987), but that analogy is highly inappropriate in
this context. States by no means have any supremacy over tribal governments, as
the Constitution, federal statutes and U.S. Supreme Court decisions consistently
show.
290. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
291. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999).
292. See LeClaire, supra note 286, at 7. LeClaire adds that comity recognition
in particular presents several problems: (1) it allows states to evaluate tribal court
jurisdiction, usually a function of federal courts; (2) it allows states to determine
whether tribal courts have adequate procedures, where Congress is normally the
institution that determines the limits of how tribes may exercise their power; (3) it
allows states to evaluate the merits of tribal court rulings; (4) it permits states to
make value judgments about tribal sovereignty; and (5) it creates the possibility of
a double standard, since under current law, states “do not look behind judgments
from sister state or federal courts, but insist on doing so regarding tribal courts.”
Id. at 13-15.
293. See John, 982 P.2d at 760 n.153 (recommending that state courts “greatly
enhance equality in the effective delivery of justice system services by associating
or blending [ ] local resources [like tribal courts] with the formal court system”
and noting that “[t]he western justice system is not always the most appropriate
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cussed below, ignoring tribal court decisions contributes to a decline in public faith of the legal system in rural Alaska.
D. Recognition of Sovereignty Requires More than Concurrent
Jurisdiction over Domestic and Internal Disputes
Congress has increasingly moved toward a policy of tribal selfdetermination.294 This policy allows a tribe to make its own decisions about internal affairs and government without outside, non295
tribal influence. It also has been a long-standing principle of law
that Indian nations exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the domes296
tic relations of their members. In a post-Venetie Alaska, it may
still be possible and appropriate for tribes to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such internal matters as tribal membership disputes,
tribal elections, ownership of tribal property or other issues that
fall solely under the rubric of the internal functions of govern-

model for the problems of many rural areas”) (quoting ALASKA COURT SYSTEM,
REPORT OF THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIRNESS
AND ACCESS 107-08 (1997)).
294. Tribal self-determination is not merely a congressional construct, but a
concept recognized by the nations of the world. See Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (“All peoples have the right to
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”).
295. Congress outlined this principle in stating the purpose for the Indian-Self
Determination Act:
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal
Government’s unique and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a whole
through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination
policy which will permit an orderly transition from the Federal domination . . . to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people[.]
25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (1994).
296. See Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); United States v. Quiver, 241
U.S. 602 (1916); In re W., No. CP-AN-37-98 (Nav. Fam. Ct., July 21, 1999) (on file
with author). “Domestic relations” in this sense refers to family and domestic relations issues, such as child custody, child support, or domestic violence, that are
confined to members of one tribe exclusively.
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ment.297 Private parties also may be able to consent to exclusive
298
tribal jurisdiction where it otherwise might not be enforceable.
The Alaska Supreme Court, along with the Governor, recently
has taken important steps to improve the condition of Alaska’s Indian tribes and respect their rights of self-government, but those
steps have not gone far enough. Although the State of Alaska recognized inherent tribal sovereignty in Alaska in Administrative
Order 186, it clearly seems to envision the role of tribes in Alaska
as municipal or borough governments, not as independent self299
governing entities. A governor’s task force opined that members
of the committee drafting portions of ANCSA originally intended
to compel Alaska’s Native entities to organize as municipal gov-

297. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 10, 45). While
some of Alaska’s tribal courts handle alcohol-related offenses, the vast majority of
their caseloads involve domestic and child-related issues, along with a small number of cases involving traditional law questions, clan property and artifacts, probate, contracts, and allotments. See Dispute Resolution in Alaska, supra note 78,
at ch. 1, 11.
298. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 29 (manuscript at ch. 10, 45).
299. For example, Administrative Order 186 seems to focus on what tribal governments can deliver to the citizens of Alaska generally, not what the tribes can
contribute to their own people:
The State of Alaska recognizes the important contribution Alaska’s
Tribes make to the citizens of Alaska. The State of Alaska recognizes
that funds generated by the Tribes represent a large positive economic
and social impact on the entire state and its citizens. The State of Alaska
recognizes and values the revenues and services that Alaska’s Tribes
contribute to the state’s economic and social well-being by virtue of their
direct Tribal authority and responsibility for the delivery of social, economic, cultural, and other programs and services.
Administrative Order No. 186, Sept. 29, 2000, available at http://www.gov.state.ak.
us/admin-orders/186.html.
The Order later states:
The State of Alaska has a long-standing commitment to local selfgovernment that is rooted in the belief that the best and most effective
solutions to local problems are those that are conceived locally . . . . The
State is committed to working with Tribes to further strengthen Alaska’s
ability to meet the needs of Alaska’s communities and families.
Id.
When read in conjunction with the earlier cited language, this excerpt indicates two things: (1) Alaska has failed to recognize the uniqueness and autonomy
of Alaska’s tribes compared with other local governments or communities in the
State; and (2) that the benefit of recognizing tribal governments will not fall on the
tribes, through the exercise of self-government and self-determination, but on the
State of Alaska, which plans to create more than two hundred “new” local governments that can deal with Alaska’s rural problems.

JOHNSON_FMT.DOC

54

04/24/01 12:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:1

ernments.300 The State’s policy also falls short because it fails to respect all jurisdictional issues, particularly exclusive jurisdiction over
301
matters involving internal affairs.
In John v. Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that
state and tribal courts share concurrent jurisdiction, but there are
some cases in which requiring litigants to respond to a tribal court
302
While the court may
located far from home might be unfair.
have been correct in concluding that state and tribal courts share
concurrent jurisdiction, it has not guided state courts adequately in
the degree of respect that should be given to tribal courts in sharing that jurisdiction.
The spirit underlying full faith and credit recognition is more
likely to promote improved relations between the state and tribes
303
304
than will comity. Tribal courts seek mutual respect and dignity,
not usurpation of jurisdiction and authority by a state government
305
that is “ever fearful of meaningful sovereignty.” If the tribes of
Alaska are to be recognized as “‘distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of
306
local self-government,” the State of Alaska should be less concerned about encroaching upon the exercise of tribal sovereignty.
Perhaps the State and its courts should not rely on the restrictive
307
and adversarial approach to sovereignty that it has in the past.
300. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 78; see also S. REP. NO. 92-405 at 133
(1971) (emphasis in original):
Native villages that are qualified under Alaska law are encouraged by
subsection (b) to organize as municipal organizations, which, of course,
serve all persons, Natives and non-Natives living within the municipality.
To provide specific motivation for villages to organize as municipalities,
subsection (b) provides that Village Corporations shall be considered
political subdivisions of the State eligible for grants, loans or contracts
under Federal law only if, and only for so long as, they do not meet the
requirements of Alaska State law to incorporate as municipalities.
301. See also JAEGER, supra note 280, at 11-12.
302. See 982 P.2d 738, 760-61 (Alaska 1999).
303. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (referring to
improved relations between Idaho state courts and tribal courts).
304. See McKay, supra note 241, at 1.
305. Pommersheim, supra note 129, at 443 (noting that this fear underlies recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have further stripped away tribal sovereignty).
306. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting Worcester
v. Georgia, 26 U.S. 515, 559 (1832)).
307. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty,
in NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 155, at 124:
“Sovereignty” is a useful word to describe the process of growth and
awareness that characterizes a group of people working toward and
achieving maturity. If it is restricted to a legal-political context, then it
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In reserving the right to exercise jurisdiction over internal matters between tribal members, the Alaska Supreme Court preserves
308
individual freedom at the expense of tribal self-governance. Sovereignty is relatively meaningless when it can be ignored or
309
avoided at the will of another government or a private litigant.
Tribal courts are the most appropriate means for resolving disputes
involving tribal members, and they are the keystone to tribal eco310
nomic development and self-sufficiency. Jurisdictional problems
in rural Alaska can be solved It is only through a partnership based
311
on equality, not dominance and subordination.
becomes a limiting concept which serves to prevent solutions. The legalpolitical context is structured in an adversary situation which precludes
both understanding and satisfactory resolution of difficulties and should
be considered as a last resort, not as a first instance in which human
problems and relationships are to be seen.
308. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 (citations omitted).
309. Cf. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New Confusion to the Law of
Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 77 (referring to
Congress’s plenary power to limit or abolish tribal sovereignty at will).
310. See Hon. Mary T. Wynne, President, National American Indian Court
Judges Association, Testimony on Fiscal Year 2001 Interior Appropriations, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, House Appropriations Committee,
Apr. 6, 2000; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1978) (citation omitted):
[Tribes] have a significant interest in maintaining orderly relations
among their members and in preserving tribal customs and traditions,
apart from the federal interest in law and order on the reservation.
Tribal laws and procedures are often influenced by tribal custom and can
differ greatly from our own. Thus, tribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting significant tribal interests.
See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (noting that allowing the exercise of state court jurisdiction “would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves”); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 57 (1995):
Tribal courts constitute the frontline tribal institutions that most often
confront issues of self-determination and sovereignty, while at the same
time they are charged with providing reliable and equitable adjudication
in the many and increasingly diverse matters that come before them. In
addition, they constitute a key tribal entity for advancing and protecting
the rights of self-government.
311. See Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, Tribal Sovereignty and the Administration of
Justice in Indian Country, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at
11. If the state courts are willing to develop an equal partnership with tribal
courts and look beyond some of the shortcomings of some tribal court systems,
then perhaps true progress and improvement can be made. See Wright, supra
note 218, at 1417-24 (discussing some of the common problems in developing
tribal court systems and suggesting that state courts should help tribal courts
achieve reforms); cf. BRAKEL, supra note 67, at 1-28 (discussing some common
difficulties that tribal court systems face, including shortages in legally trained per-
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If we apply the John court’s analysis of member-based jurisdiction to the logical conclusion, that in the absence of Indian country
tribes can still assert jurisdiction over their members, then tribes
also should be entitled to primary jurisdiction. This position would
be consistent with the State of Alaska’s current view of the role of
tribal governments within the State. Absent these improvements,
tribal courts could be faced with “sore loser” litigants, like Mr.
Baker, who go forum-shopping to the state courts when they receive an unfavorable ruling.
Without any avenue for enforcement, tribal court operations
312
will be curtailed severely, creating problems for Natives and nonNatives alike in rural Alaska. This is particularly true given the in313
creasing role of tribal courts and the increasing presence of
314
The perception of the
Alaska Native groups in rural Alaska.
people can often shape the credibility of a court system, even with
315
non-Indian courts. In John v. Baker, when the state superior
court assumed jurisdiction after the tribal court had already rendered its decision, the people of the tribe lost faith in their court
316
system. The U.S. Supreme Court warned that stripping tribes of
the dispute resolution systems established for their members could
317
“undermine the authority of the tribal courts.” When state courts
claim jurisdiction after tribal courts have spoken, this warning may
come true.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the long history of anti-Native sentiment that has driven
the State of Alaska’s policy toward Alaska’s tribes, it is no doubt
that the John v. Baker decision is a hard pill for anti-sovereignty

sonnel, language barriers, insufficient avenues for appellate review, tribal politics,
problems in selecting tribal judges, and difficulties in providing judicial training).
312. Cf. JAEGER, supra note 280, at 56.
313. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 55, at 843 (“As important sovereigns within
the federal union, Indian tribes and their operations impact the daily lives of large
numbers of Indians and non-Indians alike.”).
314. See generally Dispute Resolution in Alaska, supra note 78; cf. LeClaire, supra note 286, at 1 (noting that one of the reasons full faith and credit recognition
for tribal courts has taken on increasing importance is because “tribes and their
members no longer live in isolation from American society.”).
315. See Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 849 (reflecting that the public vision of a politicized federal judiciary system seems to grow more popular each
year).
316. See Dispute Resolution in Alaska, supra note 78, at ch. 2, 22.
317. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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proponents to swallow. Arguments against tribal sovereignty,
however, fail in light of reason, law, and policy. All indigenous
people have an inherent right and power to govern, a right that
preceded the existence of this Union and its members. Understanding how to place that origin in context, to define the relationship between the many inherent sovereigns and the United States,
is where the issue becomes confusing.
Even though the task may be daunting, the State of Alaska
can gain more than it loses by fostering a positive relationship with
its more than 200 tribes. Part of that process shall and must involve
building trust between the state and tribal court systems, as many
states have already done by developing specific rules for the recognition of tribal court decisions. It can only be successful, however,
if the state legislature becomes involved. The established law limits
what the Alaska Supreme Court can accomplish. It will require a
forward-thinking legislature to put the principles in place to develop full faith and credit recognition as a reality. As tribes become increasingly recognized as a third sovereign in our federalist
system, states and Congress are concluding that the most consistent, fair, and respectful mechanism for recognition of tribal court
decisions is through full faith and credit recognition.

